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NUMBER 21

The Dawn of the New
Age and the Birth of
the Modern Spirit

The Triumph of Rationalism
and Skepticism in the
World's History

JOSEPH McCABE

EDITED BY
E. HALDEMAN-JULIUS

SOCIOLOGY
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HISTORY
RATIONALISM
EDUCATION



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HALDEMAN-JULIUS PUBLICATIONS
Girard, Kansas

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Printed in the United States of America

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THE DAWN OF THE NEW AGE AND THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN SPIRIT

CHAPTER I.

THE WHITE TERROR

ONE of the most remarkable pages of history, though few writers of history even glance at it, is that which records certain events at Paris on the night of August 4th, 1789. The scene is the meeting-room of the National Assembly, the body of representatives of the three estates of the French nation: the nobles, the clergy and the people. They are concluding a long discussion of the rights of man. We will not forget that the real light which illumined the mind of the Assembly was the glare of the burning Bastille and of hundreds of châteaux and monasteries, the glow of a flame of passion that swept nearly the whole of France. Nevertheless, the facts are notable. A wealthy and elegant noble rises and proposes that "in this age of light when sound philosophy has regained her sway" the nobility and clergy shall voluntarily lay all their privileges at the feet of the people. Dukes and marquises, archbishops and bishops, jostle each other in their eagerness to mount the tribune and renounce all their feudal and ecclesiastical rights. Even the common priests forswear their pitiful stipends. No class, no individual, hesitates. A fire of enthusiasm lights the entire Assembly, and at two in the morning prelates and nobles and lawyers, priests and atheists, proclaim with streaming eyes that the feudal system is forever abolished, and the reign of universal brotherhood is inaugurated.

Slowly the clock of time ticked its ironic message, and twenty-six years later the nobles and prelates gathered again at Paris with white-hot zeal—to recover all their feudal privileges and let the last drop of revolutionary blood out of the veins of the French people. We saw what had happened. Most of the nobles and the higher clergy had repented of their night of idealism, fled the country, and induced Prussia, Austria and England to attack France: the revolutionists themselves had blundered and had alienated the sympathy even of the mass of the people of Europe; France had exhausted herself, and Napoleon's towering ambition had let in her enemies. Despotism still had one formidable ally: the ninety per cent illiteracy of the peoples of Europe. If we find a cultivated American historian (Dr. W. S. Davis, "Europe Since Waterloo") writing in the year of scholarship, 1926, that during the French Revolution "a light woman had been encouraged as she screamed a ribald song from the high altar of Notre Dame in Paris"—which is a lie in every word—we shall not be surprised that the massively ignorant Euro-

pean peoples of a century ago could be persuaded to see only crime and vice in the great attempt to liberate them from tyranny.

Europe sank back into feudalism. A hundred years ago it was, in most parts, back in the condition of general ignorance, squalor, poverty, a semi-slavery from which the French Revolution had sought to lift it. The creation of modern civilization in Europe is the work of the last hundred years. This is the last of the great historical truths which are not clearly stated in the ordinary manuals of the history of Europe. If any of my readers with sufficient leisure and access to a moderately good library feels that this is to him a novel and hardly credible statement, let me suggest that he look up, in any specialized expert works, the facts and figures, not rhetorical statements, about any or all of the following points:

The material condition (sanitation, etc.) of the cities of Europe in the third decade of the nineteenth century.

The figures, wherever available, of illiteracy and crime.

The administration of justice and the state of the jails.

The character of political authority.

The wage of the mass of the workers and cost of food.

The laws governing expressions of opinion on politics and religion.

The general condition of manners and morals.

The condition and number of hospitals and charitable institutions.

The status of women.

The labor of children and state of workshops.

In the seventh chapter I will summarize evidence on these points in regard to England, which then had the best record in Europe, and will say here only what you will find in the research which I suggest. You will find that all the "progress" which historians attribute to the later Middle Age, to the Renaissance period, and to the earlier part of what they call Modern Times (1500-1800 A. D.) had left nearly ninety per cent of the people of Europe as ignorant, squalid, poor, and exploited as ever; that industry and agriculture were, on the whole, hardly better than they had been in the days of the Romans or the Moors; and that only the few main streets of the larger cities were paved, drained, lit or policed, and that badly. You will find the means of transport and communication no better than they had been in the Roman Empire, the holidays and pleasure of the people immeasurably less, the ravages of disease almost as bad. You will find the administration of justice abominable, the treatment of prisoners unspeakably foul and stupid, the amount of personal liberty (of thought, expression and action) less than in the earlier centuries, and the despotism of political and ecclesiastical authorities as great as ever, the condition of the workers and of the women and children atrocious.

Now that history is a science we have exhaustive studies of all kinds of questions, but we still wait for some professor to give us an exact and detailed study of the most important of all historical questions: What progress was made in the different periods of European history, and what were the causes of the advance, the

failure to advance, or the decay in each period. The reader will quite understand why this vital question—since it is only in this way that we can find which agencies are really progressive, and which are reactionary—is never treated with complete candor. In all schools and colleges the pupils belong to sects or parties, political or religious, which take violently opposite views on such questions, and the teacher has to be “neutral,” if not generous to the more powerful party. Here we have no such limitation. And I repeat, and ask the reader to verify the statement by making the study I suggested, that, not merely at the date of the American Revolution, but half a century later, Europe had scarcely returned to the level of 150 A. D. It was better in a few respects (abolition of slavery and gladiators) but worse in most respects (education, law, status of the free workers, personal liberty, philanthropy, etc.). It was in every respect inferior to the civilization which the Moors had developed in Spain in less than two centuries, yet the European civilization of 1820 A. D. represented thirteen centuries of toil and turmoil. It follows that in the last hundred years Europe has made far more progress than in the previous thirteen hundred, and we have to find out why. That is the most important of all the questions that you can put to the historian.

§1. THE HOLY ALLIANCE

From 1800 to 1830 there was, as we shall see, much advance in science and some progress in education, but in all other respects there was a black reaction. It is clear that the progress of the world depended on the realization of the ideals of the middle-class and generally skeptical literature which we found slowly growing from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. For a few years the French Revolution had broadcast those ideals, and Napoleon had, except as regards political authority, generally embodied them in his constructive work. Let us try, to get this as precisely as possible. General statements on the strength of a few facts are the bane of history and the opiate of reaction.

The French Revolution of 1789 to 1791, which was a constructive, orderly and generally peaceful political development (as we saw), abolished slavery and serfdom, passed a law of universal education, gave equal political rights to all men, granted perfect freedom of thought and expression, purified the administration of justice, suppressed torture, extinguished all hereditary titles and privileges, and opened the paths of fortune and success equally to all men. Napoleon partly destroyed these ideas, but he sustained the abolition of serfdom and the law of general education; he attempted to reform law and justice over nearly the whole of Europe; and he interfered with expressions of opinion only on the political side. He knew that nearly all his best generals, ministers, scientists, and artists—as well as his brother Jerome—were skeptics, as he himself probably was.

Russia, Prussia, Austria and England defeated Napoleon, and the representatives of the powers gathered at Vienna to reconstruct

Europe. There was amongst them a general feeling that concessions must be made to the new spirit of Europe, but Louis XVIII, the king of France, who swore to respect its new liberties, was at once rushed by his nobles into such a frenzy of reaction that Napoleon broke loose from Elba, and nearly the whole country flocked joyously to his standard. He was defeated at Waterloo (1815) and confined in the island of St. Helena until he died (1821). The Vienna Congress resumed its work. The dreams of reform which some of its members had entertained were ignored, and, as is customary, the victorious powers were content to reward themselves by further annexations of territory from feeble countries. What happened at Versailles in 1919 sufficiently illustrates the Vienna Congress of 1815.

The chief powers remained in alliance for the purpose of preventing any disturbance of the settlement, and the Tsar of Russia, Alexander I, sought to give the coalition a peculiar character. He invited the powers to form a "Holy Alliance," based upon the Christian religion, for the complete realization of justice in Europe. Alexander was a new type of Russian. His tutor had been a French liberal, and he had been mentally reared on the idealist literature of the eighteenth century.

We must realize that this idealism had spread far beyond the frontiers of France. It had, as we shall see, many pupils amongst the great figures of the Revolution in America, and it is embodied in the American Constitution. It had inspired a very large and powerful reform-party in England. Even Wilberforce, the early Abolitionist, had learned his humanitarian ideas in the skeptical literature to which he was devoted in his youth. In Portugal, we saw in the last volume, it had guided the Marquis of Pombal in an heroic attempt to save and restore the country. In Spain and Italy it had thousands of followers. In Germany the superb poetry of Goethe and Schiller gave it the same appeal to the nation as it afterwards obtained in England through the poetry of Byron and Shelley. There was no country in Europe that had not a group of writers, each with tens of thousands of readers, who adhered to the fundamental principles of the American and the French Revolution.

It had therefore at first seemed to the monarchs and statesmen of Europe that it would not be possible to bring the world back completely to the position of 1789, and the rally of the whole French nation to Napoleon when he burst out of Elba confirmed them. Hence it was that Alexander I, combining the humanitarianism which he learned from his French tutor with the mysticism which he adopted from a German visionary, the Baroness von Krüdener, proposed a Holy Alliance of the powers to maintain peace, prevent revolution, and suppress all injustice. The English minister advised his sovereign that it was "a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense," and England did not formally join the Holy Alliance. We shall see that England was by this time firmly established in its reaction to the Revolution, and its reform party was scattered and almost powerless. Prussia and Austria, to keep the forces of despotism in alliance, insincerely subscribed to Alexander's grand plan to inaugurate "a new era of justice and right." The Tsar got one of

his ministers to draft a very liberal constitution, partly modeled on that of America, for Russia, and he even projected a kind of League of Nations to prevent war. But the Tsar was a child in intellect beside the astute statesmen of the other powers, especially Prince Metternich of Austria, and he was soon convinced that all these eighteenth-century ideals came from the bottomless pit. The Holy Alliance degenerated into a most unholy coalition of despots to stamp out the last embers of liberal aspiration.

§2. THE BLOODY RECORD OF DESPOTISM

The reaction began in France with the punishment, for "rebellion," of the leading men who had joined Napoleon in his attempt to recover his throne. Louis XVIII and his nobles had fled in terror to Belgium while England and Prussia had defeated Napoleon for them. The Allies impressed on the French king that he must on his return be moderate and tactful, but his courtiers at once demanded the most truculent reprisals; nor do I find any sound evidence for the common statement that Louis himself was a good and wise man who was overborne by his bishops and nobles. Vengeance and the recovery of their wealth and feudal privileges were the ruling passions of the whole aristocracy. Europe expected some reprisals, but it was shocked when one of Napoleon's finest generals, Marshal Ney, and thirty-seven other distinguished men were executed. Hundreds of others were thrust into jail, and thousands fled to Belgium and other countries. In the provinces the Catholics were permitted or encouraged to repeat the scenes of 1789 and 1792. Few historians devote as much space to the horrors of the Restoration as they do to those of the Revolution, but Altham in his short summary frankly says: "The White Terror in the south of France rivaled the Red Terror of the Revolution: wholesale pillage and murder, and hundreds of executions." Most historians do not even mention it.

Apart from the punishment of political rebels the new French government rapidly undid the best work of the Revolution. The liberty of the press was suspended, and a stern watch was kept on all expressions of opinion. The law of divorce was abolished. The work of education was checked, and such schools as the Revolution and Napoleon had created were put in the charge of the Church. There was so much sullen resentment in the country that Louis for a time appointed a more liberal minister, but the assassination of his nephew in 1820 let loose again the passions of the nobles. Louis died in 1824, and the still more incompetent and fanatical Charles X, his brother, came to the throne. The despotism of Church and State was now supreme. Sacrilege was punished by amputation of the hand. The nobles voted themselves \$200,000,000 compensation for their lost estates. Trial by jury was abolished, and the jails—inconceivably filthy and poisonous dens in those days—were filled with humanitarians. The press was again muzzled, and all liberty of expression denied. You have probably heard of the brilliant French Catholic writers Chateaubriand and Le Maistre. This was their age,

but you will search their pages in vain for any protest against the reign of brutality. Yet the country, on a very limited franchise, returned a majority of representatives to oppose the reaction, and when the autocratic monarch went on to dissolve the Chamber, Paris broke into the Revolution of 1830, to which we will return later.

The conduct of the French ruling class shocked Europe, but the conduct of the restored king of Spain, Ferdinand VII, shocked even France. During his absence the liberals, under the protection of the French, had in 1812 abolished the Inquisition and established a Cortes (Congress) for which every adult male could vote. Ferdinand solemnly promised to respect this new Constitution before he returned in 1814, but he at once tore it to pieces and inaugurated the White Terror. Six years of bloody tyranny followed. The Inquisition was restored, and an army of spies, generally members of the religious "Society of the Exterminating Angel," spread over the country. Large numbers of men were put to death, and every known skeptic or humanitarian was imprisoned or exiled. Delicate ladies were sent to the foul jails and even the galleys because they would not denounce husbands or brothers. Informers were rewarded, and there was hardly a house in Madrid where search was not made for concealed liberal opinions. You got ten years in jail if you were found in possession of a copy of the London "Times," which was then the leading Conservative paper of Europe. In short, as you will again find little about this in manuals of history, let me sum up the situation in the words of a Conservative British historian, the highest recent authority on Spain, Major Hume ("Modern Spain," 256):

"Modern civilization has seen no such instance of brutal, blind ferocity as that which followed the arrival of Fernando in Madrid Not even the most bloodthirsty wretches of the French Reign of Terror equaled the President of the Military Commission at Madrid."

After six years of brutal repression Spain was still so imbued with French ideals that in 1820 it rebelled, captured the king, abolished the Inquisition, and restored the Constitution. It took a French army of 95,000 men to restore the king three years later, and it was then that the above Commission was set up. The press was almost abolished, and schools and colleges were generally closed. We have not yet finished with the persecution of liberalism in Spain, to which we return later, but you may already begin to realize that the Spaniards are not by nature the indolent and submissive people you had imagined. Ferdinand persecuted for twenty years, yet thirty years after his death the royalist-clerical rulers were issuing decrees which, Major Hume says, "would have shamed Ferdinand VII," and they have returned to the same outrages in our own time.

It may sound incredible, but the despotic savagery was even worse in Portugal. The success of the skeptical Marquis of Pombal in the eighteenth century shows that the educated Portuguese had already largely embraced the ideas of the French philosophers, and at the restoration they managed to retain more of the revolutionary

ideals than any other country. The royal family had fled to Brazil and for some years refused to return. When the king did return he found it necessary to respect the Constitution. In 1828, however, Don Miguel got the throne, after swearing a solemn oath to respect the liberal Constitution. You will read in so sober an authority as the Cambridge Modern History (X, 321) how he deliberately took this oath, relying on "the absolution of the Church," and had no intention to keep it. Once he had ascended the throne he completely destroyed the Constitution and inaugurated the most ghastly persecution of that terrible age.

Historians do not take the same trouble to count the victims of the White Terror as they do to give us the total of the victims of the French Revolution, and we can no more admit without reserve the estimates of radical writers than those of their opponents. But some idea of the horror is conveyed when we find Portuguese historians of the liberal school stating that about 17,000 Portuguese democrats and humanitarians were executed during the reign of Miguel (for both religious and political heresy), about the same number were deported to the African penal settlements, and about 30,000 were put in the fetid jails. Even if we take off a large discount from this total, it seems to follow that the White Terror had far more victims in Portugal alone than the Red Terror had in France; and the White Terror raged in half a dozen countries. I may add here, that we may appreciate how far the modern spirit had spread a century ago and what bravery it inspired, that after eight years of fierce persecution the Portuguese liberals were still strong enough to rise and drive Miguel into exile; that there were afterwards further long spells of persecution, and education was more drastically restricted than in any other country; yet that in 1910 the Portuguese liberals were able to effect the most thorough revolution against Church and State of modern times.

The "healing of Europe" was hardly less truculent in Italy. Napoleon had swept out all the old feudal authorities and created a kingdom of Italy with enlightened laws and a large measure of personal liberty. In 1815 the feudal powers crept back, with the same fierce determination as elsewhere to root out all the new idealism. The kingdom of Piedmont, an enlargement of the medieval Duchy of Savoy, was restored in the north, and even its comparatively decent ruler set up again the old feudal regime and controlled the press and education. The Pope recovered the Papal States. The Inquisition was re-erected, several thousand monasteries were re-populated, and all the old fiscal corruption, brigandage, drastic restriction of science, total neglect of popular education, etc., returned. One should read in Mr. Bolton King's authoritative "History of Italian Unity" the frightful record of the Papal States for the next few decades. The Austrians in the north were hardly less truculent in suppressing the feeblest expression of liberalism, and King Ferdinand of Naples was "the worst despot in the Peninsula." It was then that secret societies like the Carbonari (originally a conspiracy to expel foreigners and regain constitutional liberty) spread through Italy. No man who knows those decades of savage repression of the

modern spirit in Italy, Spain, and Portugal will be disposed to repeat the contemptuous expression "dagoes." The educated minority made a noble fight. They laid down their lives in thousands and sacrificed their property and liberty in hundreds of thousands, for the rights of man.

In Germany and Austria the persecution was less sanguinary and malevolent, but nearly every ruler sought to extinguish the last embers of the new spirit. The unity which Napoleon had to some extent secured was broken, and Germany became a Confederation of thirty-nine states. All the feudal dukes, archdukes, archbishops, kings, etc., returned to their palaces, and "death to atheists and revolutionaries" was the one sentiment in which they agreed. Except in Prussia, which, from the time of Frederic the Great, led Europe in educational progress, the new zeal for schools and colleges was sternly checked. The press and books were severely controlled. The Grand Duke of Weimar, a friend of Goethe, alone distinguished himself by granting free and liberal institutions, but when the students of most of the German universities followed the lead of those of Jena and began a strong agitation on behalf of liberty, the Austrians summoned a conference of all the German states at Carlsbad (1819). Decrees were drawn up, and were later promulgated by the Diet at Frankfort, dissolving all the students' clubs and associations, appointing reactionary censors for the universities, and entirely destroying the freedom of the press and of other publications. By 1820 it looked as if the new spirit was doomed over the entire Germanic world, but we shall see presently how it had merely been driven into silence.

Austria, it need hardly be said, led the reaction. Its ruler from 1806 to 1835, Francis I, mumbled, "I do not want educated but loyal subjects," and Prince Metternich, his leading statesman, was the chief nerve of the general European reaction. Feudalism was completely restored, and, as Bohemia and Hungary were still subject to Austria, all the fine independent spirit of the Czechs and Magyars was firmly suppressed. How Louis Kossuth and other liberals began the fight for the rights of man we shall see later.

Of Russia little need be said. Alexander I soon found that his grand plan of reform was "a frightful illusion," and feudal despotism in its most medieval form continued in Russia. Science was tabooed at the universities, and Russians were forbidden to go to study at German universities. Tens of millions of serfs remained in all the degradation of the Middle Ages. Turkey would hardly be expected to show more enlightenment than the Christian powers, and we need note here only that the French Revolution had at length aroused the spirit of the Greeks, and they began a brave fight for liberty. Tens of thousands of Greeks were killed, and further tens of thousands sold into slavery, before the European powers intervened, as we shall see, and forced Turkey to give the Greeks independence.

In England there was not the same sharpness of reaction because the feudal system had been mitigated before the end of the eighteenth century, as we saw, and there had been no revolution and

restoration. But the British system of "representation of the people" was, as we shall see, corrupt and fictitious, and the conservative ministers tightened the laws against heresy, political or religious. This had been done during the French Revolution, so there was little change after 1815. How the disreputable character of the royal family gave a chance for the restoration of radicalism in the later twenties we shall see in the next chapter. On the whole, the reaction in England was bloodless. Rebels were imprisoned or shipped to the new penal colonies in Australia.

CHAPTER II

THE TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRACY

IN an earlier volume (No. 5) I illustrated the great crises in the evolution of life by a parallel in European history. You will remember that life had, after more than a billion years of development, only reached the level of the reptile and the pine-tree when the first crisis, the Permian Revolution or Ice Age, set in. This led to the appearance of higher types, the bird and mammal, but there was a prolonged reaction, or return of the heat, and the brutal reptiles lorded the earth. The second crisis, or lowering of temperature, slew the reptiles and opened up the northern hemisphere to the birds and mammals. But there was again a reaction of climate, and even the ancestor of man merely advanced from the ape to the ape-man stage in thirty million years. The third crisis or revolution, the last Ice Age, made modern man and in the end led to the rise of civilization.

This is an instructive parallel to the rise of the race out of medieval conditions. The development in America was in many respects unique, as the conditions were totally different, and it will be described in the next volume, but what I have said will reconcile any reader to my claim that the Middle Ages really lasted until the end of the eighteenth century. Then the French Revolution dethroned the dinosaurs of Europe, but they were merely driven to the sheltered valleys of other lands, and they crept back in 1815. The period from 1815 to 1830 is the Age of Reptiles of modern history. We are not here concerned with the ideas which permitted educated and refined rulers and their ministers—a very different set, remember, from the uneducated and downtrodden men who had committed outrages in France—to *perpetrate* these brutalities, but, while striving to keep as fair a sense of proportion as we can, we must recognize that they were fighting for their own power, privileges, and wealth, however sincerely some of them may have believed they were also protecting civilization. In any case they, from every modern point of view, arrested the progress of the race. They tried to stifle the ideals on which progress depended: freedom of discussion, universal education, equality of opportunity, the emancipation of woman, the uplift of labor, the purification of justice, the advance of science, and the liberty of the individual. The men who from 1815 to 1830 refused to forswear those ideals died, languished in unspeakable jails or penal colonies, and saw their wives and children impoverished and disgraced. Every country in Europe will yet raise a monument to those brave and devoted soldiers.

§1. THE REVOLUTION OF 1830

But the new spirit, the modern spirit, could no longer be *extinguished*, and in the later twenties it smouldered again throughout

Europe and prepared to burst into flame. France was, as we saw, so tyrannically ruled from 1824 to 1830 by Charles X that reaction itself caused a reaction, but I should say that England rather led in the new advance; though what it won at this period was not a very great gain in itself. I have said that as soon as the excesses of the French Revolution occurred the ruling class in England had turned upon the rapidly increasing body of radicals and scattered them. But the milder social and political heresy which we call liberalism could not be attacked so safely, and it continued to spread. Events were bringing on in England the stage of power of the middle-class Liberals, though in this early phase they were known as Whigs, and with all its limitations it was an important stage in the liberation of Europe.

Many circumstances favored this development more in England than elsewhere. The world-commerce of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the exploitation of India and the colonies, and the great industrial development which followed the larger use of coal and the invention of machinery, made England the richest country in the world for its size and gave it the most extensive middle class. Literature and science were, as we shall see, assiduously cultivated. The middle-class men as a body resented the feudal arrogance of the noble land-owners and struggled with them for the control of Parliament. The system was, as I will explain later, so corrupt that the struggle was largely a case of bribery against bribery, but the new literature was creating a considerable body of middle-class men of finer ideals, and these were stung by the corruption of the political system and of the court and found this an effective argument with the workers of the cities.

If the reader could consult at least my short biography of Robert Owen (1771-1858) he would see how social ideals were having a remarkable success in Britain in the worst period of the European reaction. Owen advocated every single modern ideal, and he incorporated them all with such brilliant success in a model industrial community (New Lanark) that he won the support of the uncle of the future Queen Victoria and other peers, while statesmen came from all parts of Europe to see his work. Not less enlightened or bold in his idealism was one of the most distinguished jurists of the time, Jeremy Bentham, an avowed atheist and all-round humanitarian. These men and others of the same ideals began the work of popular education and sternly denounced the brutality of the new industrial system. In this, of course, they came into conflict with the manufacturing middle class, but their ideals spread, and the government was forced to publish more than one damning inquiry into the state of the workers before 1830.

The easier line of advance was the political line, and workers and middle class united in a very ominous attack upon the system. The king and aristocracy were desperately opposed to reform, but the easiness of their morals made them vulnerable. The agitation was at its height before the second French Revolution occurred, and its success was only a question of time. No doubt the success of the

French rebellion encouraged it, and in 1831 England was not far from civil war. Public meetings were sometimes attended by 200,000 working men, and their language was often blood-curdling. The king was pelted with mud on the streets of London. The radical daily, the "Chronicle," asked its readers if they would tolerate the interference of "the royal bastards" and their "poor driveling begetter" and his "nasty German frau." The workers began to manufacture pikes by the hundred thousand and drill by night. So in 1832 the "Great Reform Bill" was passed. It was not "great." It enfranchised the middle class and left out the workers, and the electoral system remained very corrupt. But a king and his nobles and bishops had been forced by the people to consent to some curtailment of their privileges, and that was a gain.

The "July Revolution" of 1832 in France occurred more suddenly and had far more effect on the evolution of Europe. On July 25th of that year the king issued four Ordinances which would have completed his despotic rule of the country, and two days later the democrats of Paris raised their barricades in the streets. The troops were mainly on the side of the people, and Charles X was forced to abdicate. The Chambers then offered the crown to Louis Philippe, a member of the Orleans branch of the royal family who had fought for the Republic, and he accepted a Constitution which limited the royal power, gave freedom of expression and religion, abolished hereditary titles, and granted trial by jury to political offenders. Louis Philippe was known as the Bourgeois (middle class) King, and, as in England, it was almost entirely the increasing middle class which profited by the Revolution. Thirty years later, Victor Hugo could describe the horrors of French life which we read in "Les Misérables." There was, consequently a rapid growth of radicalism and Socialism, fostered by the liberties granted in the new Constitution. How this at length, in the forties, disposed the court to revert to despotic measures and led to a third revolution we shall see presently.

France, as on the occasion of its earlier revolution, gave a lead to the whole of Europe. In Germany the attempt to imitate the French was unsuccessful and disastrous. Germany was still, as we saw, divided into thirty states, and there was no great capital like Paris to concentrate the strength of the rebels. The rulers could unite much more easily than the workers and thinkers of the isolated cities, and the armies consisted mainly of quite illiterate rustics who were instinctively loyal. The few riots in the cities brought only an intensification of the despotic rule, and the "agitators" were scattered over Europe. Riots and revolts in Italy were similarly extinguished by the Austrians, and the rebels became outlaws. It was at this time that Mazzini, a Deist of lofty ideals, organized the growing democratic sentiment in his Young Italy Society (1831). He was forced to fly to Switzerland, and then to England, which now became the refuge of half the democrats of Europe. The reader will, if he can consult it, find a detailed study of political events in England in my biography of G. J. Holyoake.

Russia was under Nicholas I, the most reactionary ruler in

Europe, and the famous secret police was now organized to pursue and destroy the numerous secret societies that aimed at revolution. Spain was still ruled by Ferdinand VII and was kept in profound ignorance and subjection. King Miguel, on the other hand, was driven from Portugal, but civil war desolated the country, and the corrupt feudal regime was sustained until the beginning of the nineteenth century. The chief echo of the July Revolution was in Belgium, which had been put under the rule of the Dutch king. Stung by the injustices of the Dutch rule and encouraged by the success of the Parisians, the people of Brussels (who generally speak and read French) started a revolt and won their independence. A conference of the European powers then gave Belgium the king who opened the actual dynasty (1832). Thus the only material gains of the second Revolution were in France, Belgium, and England, but the spirit expressed in it had received a new continental advertisement.

§2. THE REVOLUTION OF 1848

The reaction after 1830 was less extensive and, except in Spain, less severe, and the idealists continued their educational work, especially in the comparatively free atmospheres of France and England. In France, Louis Blanc led a Socialist campaign against the middle class which now ruled the country, and it was at this period that the workers adopted the red flag and began to use the word "bourgeois" (which is merely the French for burgher or citizen, and so was at that time equivalent to "middle class") with contempt. Bad harvests and other disasters brought on a period of economic distress and aided the Socialists. The government retorted by restoring the old despotic measures to strangle discussion. Its head at this time (1840-8) was the Catholic historian Guizot whose ornate platitudes about civilization are still often quoted with respect, but he was a corrupt and despotic reactionary and he tampered with the elections. This raised the country to a white heat once more, and the "February Revolution" of 1848 followed. The troops sided with the people, and Louis Philippe fled to England. A Republic was declared, and Louis Napoleon, nephew of the great emperor, was elected its first President. Concessions were made even to the Socialists by the establishment of National Workshops, which Louis Blanc demanded. But the Minister of Public Works was hostile to the idea, and he took care that the scheme should break down and discredit the Socialist theory.

In England the "Chartist riots" reflected the disturbance abroad. They were, in fact, ineffective demonstrations, but the Chartist body had served a useful purpose in educating the mass of the people. We shall, of course, see more about these historic social movements in a later volume. Here it is enough to say that the efforts of Robert Owen, Richard Cobden, and other popular writers and speakers had led to the formation of large Trade Unions on the one hand and a powerful working-class political party on the other. The latter body was known as the Chartists, as they expressed their leading demands in a short Charter of six clauses: five of which, I may say, have long

been accepted in the English system of popular representation. Beyond the political education of the masses the Chartists accomplished nothing. The electoral system remained very corrupt, the jails were foul, the factory life vile, the schools miserably inadequate. It was not until 1867 that political rights were again extended, and not very generously. Progress in England in these decades rather took the form of factory legislation and a very slow extension of the school system, as we shall see later.

In Europe the echoes of the February Revolution were more resonant. Spain and Portugal were, as I said, in hopeless subjection, but the Italians and Germans organized formidable revolts. Even before the rising at Paris there was, in January, a successful revolt at Naples, and Ferdinand II, whose rule was an acknowledged disgrace to civilization, was compelled to grant a Constitution. The king of Piedmont, a moderate ruler, then granted a liberal Constitution, and declared war upon Austria, which still held Venice and a large part of northern Italy as legacies of the old Holy Roman Empire. But the ambition of the Piedmontese to unify Italy was premature. They were defeated, and reaction was restored in Naples and the north. Pope Pius IX had unpatriotically sided with Austria and the reactionaries, and the Romans drove him from the city and set up a republic. Garibaldi, Mazzini, and other democrats flocked to Rome, and it seemed as if the new spirit had won there its greatest victory. But the French President, Napoleon, sought favor with his Catholic subjects by sending an army to destroy the Roman Republic. Reaction was completely restored throughout Italy, but such fierce anger was aroused in the democrats of France and Italy that the work of liberation took deeper roots than ever. On my study-wall, confronting me as I write, are many relics of those stirring days bequeathed to me by one who played no mean part in the struggle: amongst them an autographed portrait of Felice Orsini, an Italian fugitive at London who crossed the Channel and flung a bomb at Napoleon. London became after 1848 the world-center of the democratic struggle, America the land of promise for the oppressed.

Belgium prospered peacefully under its new king, but the Dutch caught the revolutionary fever in 1848 and won important constitutional liberties from their monarch. The Swiss also broke into revolt against the tyranny of the wealthier minority, and in 1848 a more liberal Constitution was secured. The referendum, adult male suffrage, and proportional representation were included in it.

§3. THE ENFRANCHISEMENT OF THE WORKERS

The Swiss, the oldest republic in Europe, thus led the rest of Europe in political progress, and the peculiar conditions of the country enable us to understand this. The French Constitution also granted manhood suffrage, and more than seven million votes had been cast in the election of the first President, but the ambitious Napoleon soon began to tamper with the Constitution. He secured

the support of the army and in 1851 arrested no less than 20,000 Republicans who realized and resisted his designs. The servile Senate offered him the title of Emperor, and in 1852 the people approved the change by 7,800 000 votes against 250,000. The growth of radicalism and Socialism had alarmed the middle class, and the Church also, mindful of his restoration of the Papacy, threw its weight on the side of Napoleon. Political progress was suspended in France until 1871, and the advanced democrats fled to London and Brussels.

In Austria the revolutionary spirit had grown steadily before 1848, and an extensive program of reforms was pressed on the government. The Magyars of Hungary, led by Louis Kossuth, sternly demanded these reforms and harassed the government, and the news of the successful revolution at Paris caused the smouldering agitation to leap into revolt. For a moment it seemed as if Austria was as successful as France and Rome. The Emperor and the arch-reactionary Metternich fled from Vienna, and a National Assembly was convoked. It lasted only a few months. The Austrian troops retook Vienna, and, with the aid of a formidable Russian army, at length subdued the Magyars once more. A more brutal system of repression than ever was instituted throughout the Austrian dominions.

The initial successes in Vienna and Paris had roused the democrats of Germany. Austria was still the leading state of the German Confederation, and, as its troops were fully engaged, the German liberals took action and set up a National Parliament. It offered the imperial title to Frederic William of Prussia, but he refused, he said, "to pick up a crown out of the mud," and, when Austria had crushed its rebels, he swept the democrats out of Germany, and the liberal Constitutions that had been won in various states were torn up.

Thus even by the middle of the nineteenth century and for some years afterwards what we may justly call the feudal system prevailed over most of Europe. Complete medievalism ruled in Russia, Turkey, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, and scarcely less medieval autocracies held power in the whole German Confederation. In France and England the middle class had won enfranchisement but showed little disposition to extend it to the mass of the people. Over more than half of Europe from eighty to ninety percent of the nations were totally illiterate, and, as we shall see, education was scanty and poor in nearly all the remaining countries.

The literature which had so far inspired the attempts to liberate Europe was essentially a middle-class literature, and indeed few of the workers could read. Its ruling principle was that the middle-class was to check despotism and feudalism and then use its power to initiate social and educational measures for the mass of the people. The new condition of Europe was, however, completely altering the position of this eighteenth-century ideal. The industrial revolution which (as we shall see) spread from England to France and Germany led to a rapid growth of cities and of the class of skilled workers. Nations which in the Middle Ages had taken several centuries to double their populations now doubled them in thirty years. Since, moreover, the middle class had everywhere depended on the threat-

ening power of the mass of the people to win their triumphs, they had themselves begun the political education of the workers, and the increased education which they secured in England, France, and Germany helped the development. The second half of the nineteenth century was bound to witness a struggle of the workers, largely against the middle class, for political rights. We must not imagine this as entirely a class war. The majority of the oracles and leaders of the workers until the last quarter of the nineteenth century were still middle-class men, but the richer industrial or capitalist middle class was, for obvious reasons, hostile, and the growth of Socialism complicated the development.

It would not be possible here even to summarize the steps by which the nations of Europe advanced to the democratic stage in which we find all of them, except where Fascism has triumphed, today. Most of the work was done in the last decades of the century. The first enlargement of the franchise was in England in 1868, and it was merely a piece of political trickery. "Few great changes," says a Conservative historian, "have come about with less evidence of principle and conviction on the part of those mainly concerned in it." The next great advance was when, in 1871, France finally dismissed its royal and imperial adventurers and became a republic, and Italy was in the same year united under the Piedmontese monarchy and given a liberal constitution. In Germany also the way for reform was opened by the victory (1866) of Prussia over Austria—we shall see these wars and changes in a later chapter—and the unification of Germany under the king of Prussia as German Emperor. Both France and Germany were now industrialized, and the organized and largely educated workers looked to radicalism and Socialism. As early as 1877 the Socialists of Germany polled half a million votes, and within twenty years the vote rose to three millions. By the end of the century the workers were generally enfranchised, literate, industrially organized, and protected by labor laws: a prodigious development for, we may say, forty years.

§4. THE EMANCIPATION OF WOMAN

The next stage, the enfranchisement of women, was inevitable, though the emancipated males long resisted the demand of the women in every country of the world. As late as 1914 only four states in the world had granted the vote to women, and they were small states like Australia and New Zealand. In England the agitation was so old that as early as 1886 the majority of the Members of Parliament pledged themselves to support the demand, yet every few years a measure was brought into the Parliament and contemptuously defeated. What was called the "militant" phase of the agitation (breaking shop-windows, etc.) in England seemed to bring success no nearer (1906-1910).

It was especially the services of the women to their respective nations during the war that finally won their enfranchisement. The law was passed in England in 1918, and a Federal law passed in America in 1920. By the latter year twenty-eight countries had


enfranchised the women (including Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Holland, Rumania, Germany, Austria, and Hungary), but France and the other "Latin" countries still refused, largely on the ground that it would mean an increase of clerical power. Spain, it is true, has included some degree of enfranchisement of the wealthier women in the fraudulent electoral system which its Dictator has devised.

Social and legal emancipation had in the case of women preceded political. Over the greater part of Europe until the last quarter of the nineteenth century the position of woman was intolerable. The married woman could not legally retain her own earnings, and in case of dispute her children could be arbitrarily taken from her and given to an unworthy husband. The learned professions and the civil service generally were closed against her. A woman was tried always by a male jury and defended by a male lawyer. In British law a man was still entitled to thrash his wife with a stick, and the grounds of divorce were more liberal for the husband than for the wife. It is pleasant to be able to record that these galling and unjust disabilities, which had for centuries caused a painful amount of brutality toward and exploitation of women, were almost entirely removed before the women vote began to exercise any pressure on legislators or women were admitted to Parliaments.

Finally, if we wish to see this development in its just historical proportions, let us remember that the last generation and ours in removing these injustices have merely restored civilization to its ancient level. The older empires (Egypt, Babylon, Crete, etc.) were autocracies; and neither men nor women had political rights, but woman was socially and legally the equal of man. It is true that in most of the Greek states and in Republican Rome the men alone voted, but woman was well on the way to attain her rights two thousand years ago, and the Stoic lawyers and rulers of the Empire at least secured for her a removal of her legal disabilities. Even in the earlier Middle Ages woman was in many countries not in a position of subjection. It was the completion of the scheme of clerical authority in the twelfth and thirteenth century which thrust her down to a more degraded position than she had had in any previous civilization; and it was, in nine cases out of ten, rebels against clerical authority who won her emancipation!

CHAPTER III

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

N the principles of modern history we see behind these victories and defeats of political ideals a very considerable influence of economic developments, and it is now advisable to glance at these. In selecting first the political evolution during the nineteenth century I am for the moment not regarding the intrinsic worth of the vote or of democratic institutions. It is, of course, now an accepted principle of political morality, formulated two centuries ago, that a people shall have a voice in making the laws it must obey and in deciding the use of the taxes it pays, but there was a broader gain to the race in the long and ultimately successful struggle which filled the nineteenth century. It brought men to consider the foundations of social life and the bases of authority. Until autocracy was shattered there was no possibility of realizing the primary dictate of the modern spirit: complete freedom to discuss and reconsider the forms of collective life which we have inherited. This liberty, incomplete as it is, must ultimately count as one of the most important achievements of the last half century in Europe.

But, as I have already hinted, the modern development was greatly influenced by economic and other material changes: so deeply that I should not be surprised if some reactionary historian does not presently plead that the triumph of liberty and justice could not have been achieved earlier, not because of the ruling ideas, but because it had to wait for our modern economic evolution. The answer to such a plea is clear enough. In every country of Europe the overwhelming majority of the clergy and the ecclesiastical as well as the political authorities actually and violently resisted these improvements when economic circumstances did begin to favor them. That is the historical root of the traditional anticlericalism of labor in Europe which many Americans fail to understand. The Church in every country was solidly allied with despotism from the French Revolution until, in the last part of the nineteenth century, autocracy was clearly doomed. It is therefore merely as a matter of historical interest that we have to study how the industrial and other developments helped in the victory of democracy.

§1. THE AGE OF MACHINERY

We have already seen the first part of this study. Europe could not indefinitely remain in the poverty and disorganization of the Dark Ages. Wealth began once more to accumulate in towns and cities, and an increasing middle class of merchants, lawyers, teachers, doctors, etc., grew up between the immense body of agricultural workers and the rich landowners, while the demands of wealth led

to a growth of the at first exceedingly small class of skilled workers. The development of navigation and commerce in the sixteenth and seventeenth century accelerated this growth. The center of gravity of the old order of society was disturbed. The middle class became a formidable force, challenging the traditional rights of monarchs and nobles, on the one hand and encouraging on the other hand a generally skeptical literature.

This force was very greatly strengthened by the opening of the age of machinery: the invention of machines and the discovery of artificial sources of power to run them. The use of coal as fuel was known in Anglo-Saxon days, if not British days, in England, but the value of that country's rich deposits was naturally not appreciated until the driving power of steam was put into a practicable shape and new and cheaper methods of making steel were discovered: until, that is to say, the latter part of the eighteenth century. It is enough to recall that until that time women had made most of the clothing in their own homes, and that as late as 1807 the first primitive steam-boat running on American waters was contemptuously spoken of as "Fulton's Folly," to realize the vast distance that the race has traveled in a hundred years.

What concerns me here is the social outcome of the development. It meant the accumulation of capital (needed for the purchase of machines and premises) in middle-class hands and the congestion of the workers in rapidly growing towns. What is now, for instance, the very large manufacturing city of Manchester in the north of England was at the beginning of the nineteenth century a large village with one paved street. In the first quarter of the nineteenth century scores of such towns were created by the building of cotton factories and ironworks. This congestion of the working population was of very material service to the middle class in winning their first constitutional victory (1832). Open-air meetings could be gathered together of from fifty thousand to two hundred thousand men. The vast majority were quite illiterate, but the spoken word of the orator was all the more eloquent and effective. The wage was low, the hours and labor repulsive, the majority of the men coarse and debased. But these congested populations gave the educator and the agitator a chance which the scattered agricultural population of earlier centuries had never provided. The decent minority demanded education and literature, and by the thirties of the nineteenth century the towns became well provided with Mechanics Institutes, for the education of the workers at night, free libraries and relatively cheap literature. By this time politics was a national passion, and the demands for further education and for political rights grew together. In the thirties Robert Owen had in England a hundred thousand adherents to the early form of "Socialism"—co-operative, not state Socialism—which he advocated, and through the Trade Unions he was able to preach his high humanitarian ideals to more than a million workers. Such development presently led in turn to the reduction of working hours per day and the sanitary control of workshops.

This complex and important advance was clearly based upon

the industrial revolution which brought together large masses of workers. Professor Schapiro remarks that the industrial revolution had little effect until after 1870, but he does not seem to realize the evolution of working class movements in England (of which, in this respect, I give an account in my "Life and Letters of G. J. Holyoake" and my small biography of Robert Owen) in the first half of the century which culminated in the rise of the Chartist and Co-operative movements and the demand for an extension of the franchise, the secret ballot, and a national system of education.

Circumstances particularly favored England for the new development. There was in the eighteenth century more political and intellectual freedom than elsewhere in Europe, as there had been two revolutions in a hundred years, and the middle class and nobles and statesmen were largely Deistic. Science consequently made most progress in England and most of the new machinery was invented there. Geology in particular was much cultivated, and the geologists soon found that England had rich deposits of coal and iron. Then came the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars and the subsequent reaction, and England suffered far less than other countries from these. Meantime it had completed its colonial empire abroad and had opened up immense markets for its cheap cotton and metal goods. The prolonged disorder in Europe which we have described enabled it to establish very firmly this industrial supremacy before the other countries fully adopted the mechanical system of production. Once more we notice that circumstances rather than racial characteristics explain history. The reader will get an interesting light on the situation today if he reflects that England, in becoming "the world's shopkeeper," neglected its agricultural production, as it was cheaper to import food and manufacture commodities, and the inevitable rise in recent decades of great industrial rivals, often with immensely superior resources in hydro-electric energy, has entirely changed its position. It can never hope to regain its old industrial position, yet it still imports nine-tenths of its food. Again it is not racial characteristics or national decay but circumstances—and the stupidity of statesmen who do not realize them—that explain the situation.

§2. THE ORGANIZATION OF LABOR

These circumstances explain also how it is that while science was so successfully applied to production generally it was so little applied to agriculture production. In point of fact, there was at first what is called an agricultural revolution. Although about ninety per cent of the race had been engaged in agriculture ever since the fall of Rome, almost no progress had been made in methods and material down to the middle of the eighteenth century. The cattle and sheep, fruits and vegetables and grains, were as poor as ever, and the implements much the same. In an earlier volume (No. 9) I showed the transformation that has taken place in the production of food in modern times through the application of science. A modest beginning of this improvement was made in the eighteenth cen-

tury. The drill and horse-drawn cultivator were introduced, the rotation of crops was invented, and the discriminating breeding of cattle began. England set up a Board of Agriculture with a periodical journal in 1793.

One effect of this was a wholesale destruction of the old type of small farmer or yeoman. He cultivated a small strip of ground, leaving part of it fallow every year, on the most primitive of methods, and put his cattle and sheep to **graze** and breed indiscriminately on the "commons," or great stretches of grass-land which were communal property. It was a wasteful system, and, in spite of all the laments over the extinction of the yeoman (as in Goldsmith's well-known poem, "The Deserted Village"), he was a totally ignorant and reactionary type. The larger land-owners adopted the new methods, ousted the yeoman, and appropriated a very large proportion of the common lands. This was mainly done by a system of what we must frankly call legal robbery. I have said that law in England was still very unjust and corrupt—but it enabled the country to meet the very rapid growth of population.

On the other hand, this revolution on the land provided the labor for the new factory system; and, in fact, capital itself soon found a more profitable venture in the factories and agriculture was comparatively neglected. The yeomen and agricultural laborers flocked to the towns and found work in the cotton mills. Professor Schapiro notes that in England the annual importation of raw cotton rose from 3,000,000 to 29,000,000 pounds, and the production of iron from 20,000 to about 1,000,000 tons, between 1760 and 1820. This vast new industrial activity absorbed the surplus agricultural population and created the large towns of the north of England. Cities in the south, like London and Bristol, contributed wagon-loads of illegitimate children from their pochrhouses.

Thus there was a new disturbance of the social equilibrium. Some millions of the workers were no longer scattered in small and isolated villages, but huddled together in close colonies of from twenty to a hundred thousand people. The conditions of the new industrial life were atrocious. Children from the age of seven worked twelve or thirteen hours a day, six full days a week (and only two holidays in the year), for two cents a day, and were bullied with a brutality in which the law took no interest. Adults worked fourteen hours a day, normally, in fetid workshops (there were no sanitary rules) for from two to two and a half dollars a week. It was a degrading and brutalizing slavery, and, when the workers began to combine to demand higher wages, Anti-Combination Laws (1799 and 1800) were passed making unions and strikes illegal. Agitators received long terms of imprisonment or were shipped to the penal colonies. Meetings of workers were dispersed by cavalry. It happened that this industrial revolution just coincided with the reaction which the French Revolution had caused in England, as we saw. Life, for the mass of the workers, was appallingly gross and hard, and drink, vice, and fighting were almost the only available alleviations. People even in England, which was still ahead of other European countries at that time, have so completely forgotten what life was

like as late as a hundred years ago that a description of it which I published a few years ago ("A Century of Stupendous Progress") caused quite a sensation.

As we saw, a fairly large body of liberal-minded middle-class men were working devotedly for reform; and again we must notice, as in France, that their drastic exposure of the state of things might have had little effect if the workers themselves had not braved the troops and held menacing demonstrations and riots. Under both influences the Anti-Combination Laws were repealed in 1819, and there was a rapid growth of Trade Unions. It is well to remember the circumstances in which they were born. I estimate that ninety per cent of the workers of Britain then worked twice the hours per week which they now do for an average wage of two and a half dollars, and food was about the same price as it now is. After buying a sufficient quantity of badly adulterated bread and potatoes for his family and paying the rent of a wretched home (in the manufacturing towns very commonly a cellar without drains or windows) a man had less than a dollar for all other purposes (clothing and other food). He had no "shows," never traveled except on foot, and could not afford milk, meat, sugar, tea, coffee, tobacco, or fruit.

To describe the development of the labor organizations would require a volume, and we shall see what is necessary about them in a later book. They were not the formidable powers they now are until near the end of the nineteenth century. The struggle for the uplift of the race still fell largely upon middle-class reformers, supported by mass-demonstration and strikes on the part of the workers. In the fifties, after the revolutionary disturbances of 1848 and the failure of the Chartist movement, big and costly strikes were very common in England. The middle-class reformers had won a legal ten-hour day for the workers, and in the fifties and sixties the workers generally won a nine-hour day by their own combinations. In 1867 the extension of the franchise brought a large body of workers for the first time into political life.

53. THE GROWTH OF SOCIAL LEGISLATION

The reformers had, as I said, secured some regulation of hours and of sanitary conditions and a restriction of child and woman labor between 1830 and 1850, but the chief part of the industrial revolution lies after 1870, and from the time it proceeds almost equally in Germany, France, and England. At the founding of the German Empire in 1867 the Constitution provided for adult manhood suffrage, though this was so checked by other clauses that it prevented the workers from exercising power. In that year, however, Karl Marx published the first part of his famous book "Capital," and, as German science was now equal to that of any other land, the country was rapidly industrialized, and the concentration of the workers in towns gave the same conditions as we saw earlier in England. The different development in Germany reflects a difference of economic conditions. The territory and population were large enough to maintain the

agricultural production at full strength in spite of the expansion of industry, but the smallness and inconvenient position of the seaboard and the absence of colonies, as compared with the navigating nations of the Atlantic coast, contrasted unfavorably with the position of England and France.

For the moment we need notice only that the industrial revolution, coming at a later date than that of England, gave an opportunity to Socialism. There was also the difference that, while the English monarch was strictly limited and became gradually powerless, the German Emperor had large autocratic powers, and the Constitution was drawn up in the interest of the wealthy. Hence Socialism made phenomenal progress amongst the industrial workers of Germany, and it was with some hope of checking its growth that Bismarck in the eighties devised the social legislation (pensions, sickness and accident insurance, etc.) which brought Germany into the front rank of the nations of Europe. Another development was the rise of a formidable industrial middle-class to dispute the traditional power of the Junkers (aristocratic land-owners), and a third element that complicated the course of events in Germany was the organization of the Roman Church as a political body (the Center Party)

The Revolution of 1871, after the defeat by Germany, inaugurated a similar development in France. The Commune which (as we shall see) had been proclaimed for a time at Paris had thoroughly alarmed the middle class; and for some years after 1871 there was a reactionary movement. It is true that the Constitution which was drafted in 1875 gave the vote for the Chamber of Deputies (or House of Representatives) to all citizens over the age of twenty-one, but it was found by census that nearly half of them were still unable to read or write. The evolution of modern France dates therefore from about 1880, and, as we shall see later, it is a record in which the French may take pride. Since I am concerned here only with broad lines of development, I need say only that the industrial organization of capital and labor now proceeded as in England and Germany. Napoleon III had left an empty treasury, a demoralized army, and a miserably inadequate school system; and the revolt of Algeria added to the national burden. French industry now advanced so rapidly that the country paid its war-debt in an amazingly short time, founded a complete system of national schools, and passed a number of laws regulating the condition of labor.

The industrialization of Italy after the union of all its provinces in a single kingdom (1871) was naturally slower. The southern part of the country was appallingly backward, and in almost all provinces the administration had for several centuries been so lax and corrupt that the new kingdom advanced very slowly. We have, however, seen the broad lines and effects of the industrial revolution which spread gradually over Europe, and they suffice for our purpose. From England, where we have sufficiently studied the evolution, it spread to other countries according to their political, economic, and geographical conditions. It has only recently reached

Russia, and it has still not penetrated to large areas of the Balkans, where one still sees the distaff and spindle as they were used in the days of Washington. I need add only that the substitution of the energy of falling water for coal in producing electrical energy is hastening the revolution everywhere. Lands that had remained overwhelmingly agricultural, and therefore backward, for lack of coal now find that their barren mountains are as valuable as the mines of England and Germany, and the concentration and education of the workers naturally follow.

CHAPTER IV

THE LIBERATION OF THOUGHT

ALTHOUGH I will attempt in a later chapter to give as precise a summary as possible of the progress made in Europe during the last hundred years, it is well to consider first certain general aspects of the history of the period. The ordinary manuals of this history are very largely occupied with the details of the Napoleonic, Crimean, Prusso-Austrian, Franco-Prussian, and other wars, or the details of the revolutionary movements and their failures which we have already noticed. Of these military movements and changes of dynasty and territory I will tell enough in the fifth and sixth chapters to make clear the present situation and problems of the various countries of Europe. The details of these big events may be of patriotic interest to the inhabitants of each country concerned in them, but there is no particular reason why the rest of us should trouble to learn how many men Napoleon lost at Austerlitz, or the names of the Triumvirs of the short Roman Republic of 1848, or the clauses of the dozens of Constitutions that were drafted one day and torn up the next.

Indeed, these details tend to obscure general truths, and there is no stretch of history in which general truths are so important as that which we are now covering. The progress made in the last hundred years is of infinitely more importance than all the wars and changes of ministers and dynasties. That progress ought in all historical education to be defined and measured as accurately as possible, and the agencies of it and hindrances to it ought to be put in the clearest light. The state of Europe a hundred years ago ought to be summarily described in every aspect, so that the pupil will realize in what condition all the alleged advances of earlier periods had left European civilization and, above all, will see that there is something quite distinctive and of the utmost value to the race in what we call the modern spirit. It is my aim to make this clear and I therefore write this volume on quite unconventional lines. Again, however, let me say that all the facts given may be verified in any authoritative history.

I defined the modern spirit as the scientific organization of life and the recognition that the liberty of the individual must be restricted only by genuine and living interests of the community. We have now seen how this was realized in several important respects: how autocracy was replaced by democracy in every country of Europe, how the right of the living generation to mold its institutions was established, how a very large measure of personal liberty was won, and some of the darkest injustices of the older economic order were gradually suppressed. We will again take a general aspect of the life of the period. These various strands of modern European evolution were, it is hardly necessary to say, vitally con-

nected with each other, co-operated with and helped each other, but we can study the development more satisfactorily if we take them separately. In fact, one of the most instructive ways of studying the history of the last hundred years would be to draw up a list of a hundred different aspects of life, such as I give in the introduction to the first chapter, and work out separately the facts relating to each improvement. That would require a large volume and here we must take broader aspects. In the next, or economic section of my program we can more conveniently study the advance of social and economic ideals.

§1. THE EVOLUTION OF PHILOSOPHY

In the period we covered in the last volume, especially the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it was important to consider philosophy. The term was, as I explained, then taken in a much broader sense than it now is. Today it is practically the same thing as metaphysics. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it meant any sort of profound reflection on life and its problems. The French philosophers and the Deistic philosophers of England, the legal, political, and scientific essayists, occupied themselves with living problems, and it was largely from their reflections and their reproductions of ancient Greek and Roman sentiments that modern ideals were born. They in that way served a direct purpose in the progress of civilization besides vindicating the right of the mind to speculate and inducing educated people to exercise that right.

At the end of the eighteenth century philosophy took the abstract form which is peculiar to it. In a later volume we shall see all that is necessary about it. Here we must notice only that in its influence on university students, especially in Germany, where the first great modern schools of philosophy appeared, it contributed to the rebelliousness of Europe. The German university students of the first half of the nineteenth century were amongst the most outspoken rebels against autocracy, just as those of Russia would be at a later date and those of China are today. In becoming strictly metaphysical, or looking beyond the concrete problems of life, philosophy narrowed the range of its influence, but it had played a notable part in awakening the modern mind to a sense of its right to speculate independently of tradition and authority. Napoleon dreaded "ideologists" almost as much as political conspirators.

§2. THE ADVANCE OF SCIENCE

The development and application to life of science are, on the other hand, two of the most distinctive features of modern times. Political and personal liberty had, as we have seen, been won in previous civilizations, but in none had there been the slightest approach to modern science. The accumulation of knowledge in the last hundred years is as unique and great an historical event as the evolution of Athenian or Medieval art, and, unlike those, it has enabled man to transform nearly every feature of his life out of recognition. Take one single comparison. In the year 130 B. C., Greek physical science reached its height in the construction of an appa-

ratus by which jets of steam were forced to turn a wheel. Seventeen centuries later, a Spaniard, probably skilled in Moorish science, ran a little steamboat in the harbor of Barcelona. Nearly three centuries later again Robert Fulton put the first primitive steamboat on the Hudson (1807). Contrast what we have done in the application of power since 1807 with what had been done from Hero's steam engine of 130 B. C. to Fulton's steamboat.

It is neither possible nor advisable here to summarize the advance of science in that period, but a few general reflections on it are desirable. The common notion that there has been a steady advance of science at least during the last five or six centuries, or that what was done in the nineteenth century could not have been done earlier, is totally wrong. For the earlier period, of course, no informed person could claim a steady advance of knowledge. The ignorant democracies of Greece checked the spirit of scientific inquiry when it was born in that country, and, when the freer Greeks of Alexandria resumed the development in the early centuries of the Christian Era, the ecclesiastical authorities of the Greek Empire suppressed it. The Arabs, we saw, gave it new life and handed on to Europe very promising rudiments of mathematics, physics, optics, astronomy, chemistry, and medicine. In every single branch research was checked and thwarted by the clerical authorities, although medicine at least promised great service to man. The development from the thirteenth century to the eighteenth was by no means free and natural.

We must, however, recognize that until the nineteenth century few had any suspicion that scientific research would prove so valuable to the race or be found so powerful a means of acquiring knowledge. Apart from medicine it was just a study of nature, and the universities disdained to put it on the same level as the study of divinity, philosophy, or literature. A comparatively few sober and intellectual men devoted themselves to it in England, France, and Germany. It was only in the second half of the eighteenth century that "natural philosophers" like Benjamin Franklin began to prove its material value. How from that time onward it was increasingly and most profitably applied to life I have shown in volume No. 9, "Man's Mastery of Life." But it was still constantly hampered and thwarted, and we must get a few clear ideas about the "conflict of science and religion" which was one of the great historical events of the nineteenth century.

§3. THE CONFLICT WITH THEOLOGY

It is now not uncommon to read that this conflict was a quite mistaken and unnecessary skirmish of scientific men who went beyond the range of science and theologians who went beyond the teaching of religion. It would be strange if a struggle that lasted many decades, engaged scores of the most brilliant men of every civilization, and inspired whole libraries of literature, could so easily be shown to be a misunderstanding. In point of fact, the conflict

was an essential and most important part of the great work of the generation which lived, broadly, from 1830 to 1870. The constructive work of modern civilization has been done mainly since 1870, but the ground was prepared for it, and the methods and material of construction were arranged, in the preceding three decades.

The alliance which from 1820 to 1830 endeavored to bring back Europe to the medieval level and completely destroy those ideals which we hold to be characteristic of modern times was, in the strictest and most literal sense, an alliance of political and ecclesiastical authority. The latter had to be challenged just as effectively as the former before modern ideals could prevail. I have before me the Syllabus or list of condemned propositions published by Pope Pius IX as late as 1864. It does not matter in the least whether this is technically a dogmatic pronouncement. It is a list of the modern views which the Roman Church was determined to resist with all its power; and it is an almost complete list of those ideals of civic freedom and independent inquiry—of the rights of man, in short—which had to be realized before medieval feudalism could end. The Protestant ecclesiastical authorities in England and Germany were not quite so retrograde in 1864, but down to 1850, at least, they were solidly allied with the reactionary forces we have described.

This is the true historical significance of the conflict. Modern attempts to explain it away, so that professors of history need no longer include it in their manuals, are based on two fallacies. One is that the scientific men of the nineteenth century were out of place in their criticisms, and this is the only point we need notice here. In every case the conflict was started by ecclesiastical writers or authorities. From the time when the historian Lorenzo Valla had first critically examined the "historical" documents which were the basis of the Papal power, when the philosopher Pomponazzi had claimed the right of the mind to speculate, when Galileo had announced his proof that the earth travels round the sun, when the Church historian Tillemont had begun a critical examination of the stories of the martyrs, ecclesiastical authority had struck. It was by no means only a question of science. All research was checked or confined within narrow limits.

It was the special function of men of science to vindicate what we now regard as a platitude: that honest inquiry may be made into any proposition that has been handed down to us. This task fell chiefly to men of science in the speculative world, as it did to reformers in the practical world, because of the great breadth of their research and the popular interest and confidence which they won by their discoveries and their human service. When the early microscopist first announced that he discovered shoals of "animalcules" in foul water, few were interested, but when the advanced microscopists of the nineteenth century showed that there were swarms of invisible bacteria causing disease everywhere the whole world listened. When the chemists of the eighteenth century laid the foundations of their science, people smiled at their eccentric interest in gases and messes, but when chemistry began to help the medical man and the manufacturer it was a very different matter.

The interesting electrical machines of the early part of the nineteenth century had been toys to a section of the public, but when it was found that these were indications of a power that would run trains and machines . . .

We need not go into detail. Let me remind those who are unfamiliar with these matters that the conflict raged long before the time of Darwin. The geologists of the eighteenth century were at once told that their research was limited by the fact of the Deluge and the fact that the earth was only 6,000 years old. The early archeologists who found flint implements in France and recognized that they were tens of thousands of years old were similarly attacked. The medical men who claimed that lunacy was a disorder of the brain or that the old men and women who were still drowned as "witches" were merely abnormal humans, the philologists who grouped the languages of the earth in families, the astronomers who found that the globes of the universe had been formed by slow accumulations of cosmic dust, were all immediately and violently assailed. In the cause of the race a stern conflict had to be waged against clerical authority; and one could easily establish that even the rebellion against despotic political authority would never have succeeded if its ally, ecclesiastical authority, had not been previously weakened. Historians never clearly explain how the French nation came to depose its king in 1830 when the Church was emphatically and solidly on the side of the monarch; how the Roman people came to expel the Pope himself and set up a Republic; or how the British nation forced the Reform Bill from a reluctant king. They never will explain these things, or the entire movement of liberation from 1600 to 1870, unless they appreciate the influence of skeptical literature quite frankly. Five-sixths of the rebels and reformers of Europe were skeptics. Science gave them invaluable aid in their appeal to the mass of the people by challenging and weakening the ecclesiastical authorities who bade them submit to despotism.

34. THE TRIUMPH OF FREE THOUGHT

We must, of course, not forget that during all this period, particularly from 1800 to 1870, education was being slowly extended to the mass of the people. The state of Europe generally in 1800 was appalling. Mr. H. G. Wells makes the singular and totally inaccurate statement that the number of schools in Europe diminished after the Reformation. In England, of which he is particularly thinking, hundreds of schools were founded and endowed after the Reformation; the two countries which first showed a national interest in education, Prussia and Holland, were Protestant countries; and, on the other side, the adult population of Italy and Spain were still illiterate to the extent of eighty-five per cent as late as 1840.

There are few statistics—so little did the authorities care about this most vital of all reforms until the early part of the nineteenth century—but after examining such facts and figures as are available I estimate that during the period of six centuries for which so much

progress is constantly claimed, 1100 to 1700 A. D., the illiteracy of Europe was reduced only from about 99 to about 95 per cent, although printing had been invented in the fifteenth century! In the eighteenth century a little more progress was made. The humanitarians of many lands, Pestalozzi in Switzerland, Rousseau in France, Adam Smith in England—later Robert Owen in England and Froebel in Germany—pressed for the education of the people, and the French Revolutionists made education one of the rights of man. But the idea of national systems of education was opposed by the clergy, and even the eighteenth century made little progress. It was stated in the British House of Commons in 1807 that nineteen out of twenty adults could still neither read nor write in England. Austria, Germany (apart from Prussia), Spain, Italy, and Portugal were in even worse plight. After this it is waste of time to inquire whether Catholics or Reformers founded most schools.

In most countries little more was done before 1870. Church rivalry with the humanitarians led to the founding of several voluntary societies in England, yet after ten years of their work (or in 1816) it was found that in London alone 120,000 children were receiving no education whatever. In 1833 the "reformed" Parliament granted \$100,000 a year toward the cost of education! During six decades the reformers fought the Church and the ruling class to secure the education of the people, yet we have it stated in a British government report that in 1860 of two and a half million children of school-age only one and a half million attended any sort of school, and 800,000 of these were merely taught to read and write in grossly inefficient schools. In 1870, when the British national system of schools was established, one and a half million children, or nearly a half of the whole, still had no education. I need say only that Prussia, Holland, and Switzerland were well in advance of England, and all other European countries behind it, and you get an important fact of history that is usually ignored.

The importance of the fact is twofold. In the first place, as all humanitarians of Europe and America had insisted, the general level of taste and character of any nation rises with education. Experience since 1870 has amply proved that. Secondly, the aristocratic theory of reform—that an educated minority will secure all justice for an uneducated majority—never worked and cannot work. The community must advance as a whole. There must be democracy of knowledge as well as of power. In fact, political democracy was won in the second half of the nineteenth century, as we saw, and it became a vital need of the race to educate every citizen. France was still unstable in 1872 because less than one in four of the population was able to read and write. South Italy held back the progress of the country because in 1901 nearly eighty-five per cent of its people still could neither read nor write.

The democratizing of knowledge, imperfect as it still is—partly from the overcrowding of the curriculum, partly from clerical control—has ended the long struggle for the liberation of the mind. I am not assuming here that skepticism is right, and that any or every form of religion is wrong. It is possible to treat this question from

a purely historical point of view. That is why I stated the facts as precisely as possible in the first chapter. The ideals formulated by the French and American Revolutions, which we all take now to be essential elements of civilization, were comprehensively denied and denounced by the allied political and ecclesiastical authorities of Europe throughout the first half of the nineteenth century. The chief thing the world needed, and the thing they were particularly determined to refuse, was freedom to examine and openly discuss the bases of their authority. The real basis was force, the use of police and armies, and this led to the sanguinary and heroic struggle which we have surveyed. The modern spirit triumphed. The individual won his right to think, speak, and act, consistently with the equal rights of other individuals, and science transformed the material aspects of life and is being increasingly applied to all our problems.

CHAPTER V

THE LEADING POWERS OF EUROPE

THE true meaning of modern times, by which, as far as Europe is concerned, I mean the period after 1830, cannot be appreciated unless we first, as I have done, trace the main development in the light of principle. Europe had been in every respect governed by force ever since it had, in the twelfth century, settled down to some sort of civilized polity after the long disorder of the Dark Ages. The modern spirit is that men will accept only those laws and institutions which they personally perceive to be true and sound. It entailed a revolution, and the essential chronicle of the last hundred or hundred and fifty years is a record of blasting operations which successively weakened and at last removed the oppressive burden of an authority which imposed itself. Liberty is still largely checked by authority. There must in a social life always be limits to individual freedom, but it is characteristic that these limits are now imposed in the name (rightly or wrongly) of the common good, and the fact that many of them exist at all is simply due to our laziness. We have established the principle throughout civilization that all laws and institutions are based on the consent or acceptance of the community. Rousseau's "social contract" is now the real fundamental principle of all authority, if the word has any definite meaning.

As modern history is usually written, it is like watching a series of stirring events at a distance. We see the conspicuous movements, we hear the crack of the guns, we note the final result, but we do not understand the struggle. We are told about all sorts of wonderful progressive agencies operating on Europe century after century—the Church in the Dark Ages, the Scholastic and artistic movements in the later Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the invention of printing, and the circumnavigation of the globe at the end of the Middle Ages, the literary activities of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—and at the end of it all, fourteen centuries after the fall of Rome, our historian has to describe a series of bloody revolutions and reactions, and, if he is quite candid, to admit that the foulness of Europe provoked and justified this violence. All this we have now seen, and we may follow the general outline of the historical record in each country with more understanding.

§1. PROGRESS IN ENGLAND

We saw in the last volume how England in the eighteenth century was making excellent progress in liberal ideas: The corrupt political system, which permitted a few hundred wealthy men and the monarchy to control Parliament, was freely and fiercely denounced. Orators of distinction attacked in the House of Commons the war

against the American colonists, and there were agitations for the abolition of black slavery, the education of the people, the reform of the penal system, and so on. The power of the throne had already been limited, as we saw, by two revolutions, and the burden on the people was not so heavy as in France, so there was not the same need of a new revolution. The Georges ruled England because their ancestor had been invited to do so by the people, and since their personal conduct was as immoral as that of the French kings, men smiled at the phrase, "by the grace of God," which they put on the coins. What shape the growing liberalism and radicalism might have taken we cannot say, but the excesses of the later French revolutionaries and the war against Napoleon enabled the ruling class to unite the country in a combined patriotic and reactionary sentiment. The groups of "Friends of Liberty," as the reformers often called themselves, were dissolved. "King and country" became again the dominant sentiment.

The reaction after Waterloo was by no means so truculent as on the continent. It was in 1820 that Shelley published his "Prometheus Unbound," a republican and skeptical poem, probably the most superb formulation of the rights of man, and it circulated widely in England. Paine's "Rights of Man" also circulated, though booksellers suffered imprisonment for selling it. A journal entitled "The Republican" ran for some time in London, and William Cobbett continued to have a large circulation for his very radical "Weekly Register." Robert Owen also, who was never prosecuted, made very considerable progress with the skeptical and idealistic movement which he called Socialism. Action through Parliament was the aim of these reformers, and the first condition was the purification of the Parliament itself. The electorate was so antiquated that some of the places which sent delegates to the House of Commons were now merely a wall, a ruined house, or a pig-stye; while in nearly every part of England the votes were bought for from fifty to two hundred dollars. Of 490 Members of Parliament 307, the majority, were "in the pockets" of 154 wealthy men who secured their election. The system stank, and in the later twenties the reformers forced a measure for its reconstruction through the House of Commons. The Lords (including the whole bench of bishops), supported by the king, rejected it, and, as I said, the country neared civil war. Pictures of the king were trampled in the mud, and hundreds of thousands of working men armed themselves. Under that pressure the king was compelled to yield, and the Reform Bill was passed.

The actual reforms brought about by the new Parliament were very few. Slavery in the colonies was abolished, but very little progress was made in education or social legislation. The country was soon absorbed in the agitation of the middle-class for Free Trade, which was at this time incorporated in British legislation. Meantime the alert workers were, as I said, organized in Trade Unions for the improvement of the conditions of labor and in a Chartist Society for securing political rights. By the middle of the nineteenth

century still only one million out of six million adult males were enfranchised; and to these only half a million were added by the reform of 1867. In 1854 England was drawn into the Crimean War, in which France and England defeated Russia, which had expressed designs on Turkey.

England remained neutral in the struggle of the French and Germans in 1870, and from that date onward its progress was more rapid. A national system of schools was set up, Trade Unions were legalized, and voting by secret ballot at the elections was introduced. By this time the Liberals alternated in power with the Tories or Conservatives, but until the last decade of the nineteenth century elections were as flagrant as ever for corruption and bribery. A Radical party, sternly opposed to the House of Lords and including a strong republican party, now arose, but it worked with and pushed on the hesitating and wealthier Liberals. It was largely the rich manufacturing class which had founded the Liberal party, and it was difficult to get from them any improvement of the conditions of labor of the mass of the people. In the eighties and nineties they were chiefly occupied in trying to secure Home Rule for Ireland, but the House of Lords still had a power of veto over the measures passed in the House of Commons, and it was not secured until the next century, when the veto was abolished. Into recent history we need not enter, or it would require an additional volume. I do not propose to do more than describe the general course of development which brought each European nation to the condition in which it entered upon the twentieth century.

§2. THE SPLENDID RECORD OF FRANCE

We have in the second chapter seen the outline of French history in the nineteenth century as far as it is of general interest. It led Europe in those drastic and violent upheavals which alone could shatter despotic authority where there was not, as in England, a constitutional method of approach. The remarkable record of four revolutions within ninety years (1789, 1830, 1848, and 1871) leads some writers to enlarge on the emotionalism or explosiveness of the French character, in contrast to that of the German or the Englishman. The real reason lies in the facts we have already seen. France was one of the countries in which Protestantism could be suppressed before the majority were converted to it, and it therefore remained subject, unlike England and Germany, to a double despotism, of Church and of State. The Revolution of 1830 ought to have sufficed to bring it on to normal lines of political development, but in that year and again in 1848 it was deceived by political adventurers who secretly aimed to restore royalty, and further political revolutions were required.

The conspicuously logical character of the French mind is shown, not merely by its literature, but by the course of events since 1870. Napoleon III had, as I said, incurred very widespread hostility and really ruled by force and with clerical assistance. He endeavored to win back the prestige of the name of Napoleon by

spending large sums of public money on the improvement of Paris and on public works, but in 1868 the Republicans of Paris openly published a manifesto. The Emperor granted a more liberal Constitution, but trouble arose with Germany, and he concluded that a victory over that power would consolidate his position. The Spaniards, after a successful revolution, had offered their throne to a German prince, and, though the prince withdrew, Napoleon offensively pressed for guarantees that at no time would a German prince be put forward. There seems little room for doubt that both Napoleon and Bismarck (who published in the press an abbreviated and misleading version of the French demand) wanted war. England remained neutral on receiving a promise that the neutrality of Belgium would not be violated, and in the space of a single month the effective German armies caused Napoleon to surrender at Sedan.

Paris at once declared France a Republic once more, and for some weeks longer maintained the war in the provinces. Paris was besieged and starved into surrender. France was compelled to cede Alsace and most of Lorraine to Germany and pay an indemnity of a billion dollars within three years. But political sentiment had in the meantime so far advanced at Paris that the Communists had taken over the city while the new government lingered in the south, and it took a second siege of Paris and the shooting down of 20,000 Parisians to reduce them. For some years this led to a middle-class reaction, the Church suddenly regaining a remarkable power. It melted away in a few years, largely because of the alliance of the Church with royalism, and in 1881 a national system of education without religious instruction was established. Friction with the Church continued, and in 1901 religious schools were closed and the religious congregations (monks and nuns) virtually suppressed. In 1905, as the struggle was still maintained, yet only about five million Frenchmen were now practicing Catholics; the Church was disestablished. France was by this time fully industrialized, and as distinguished as any nation in science. It had secured a large colonial empire in Africa and Asia, and in 1897 it entered into an Alliance with Russia, which was followed in 1904 by an agreement (*Entente Cordiale*) with its historic enemy England.

53. THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY

After the defeat of Napoleon, we saw, Germany became a Confederation of thirty-nine separate states, the chief of which were Prussia and Austria. In 1834 seventeen of these states agreed to a Tariff Union (*Zollverein*), having free trade with each other and a common tariff against outsiders. But the splitting of the German nation into so many fragments retarded development, and separate parties formed in favor of Austria or Prussia taking the lead. In 1848, as we saw, the radicals prevailed for a time and set up a "German National Parliament," with adult suffrage, at Frankfort. The revolution was checked in the following year, and Prussia and Austria drew together in a common zeal to suppress every variety of

liberalism. Then began the great exodus of German humanitarians to the United States.

In 1862 Bismarck became Prussian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and his resolute and ambitious mind directed the fortunes of the country for the next thirty years. Within a week of his appointment he stated publicly that "the unity of Germany would be realized by blood and iron." In 1866 trouble arose about the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, which Prussia claimed, while Austria resisted the claim. The south-German states joined Austria, but in a seven weeks' campaign the Prussian troops decisively defeated them. Austria was now compelled to withdraw from the Germanic Confederation, and, as it had already been defeated in Italy, its power and prestige in Europe materially shrank. Prussia, on the other hand, conciliated the southern states (Bavaria, etc.), and in 1867 became head of a new German Confederation of twenty-two states, the king of Prussia being President of the Confederation.

France took alarm at the rise of Prussia, and both countries improved their armies in anticipation of war. It broke out, as we saw, on the pretext that Prussia would not agree to prevent any German prince from accepting the crown of Spain, and France was quickly and decisively beaten. Alsace and the greater part of Lorraine were ceded to Germany. French is spoken in a large part of Lorraine, and Bismarck allowed France to retain so much of it as he thought consistent with military security. Lorraine contains one of the largest deposits of iron ore in the world, but on the processes known in the iron industry at that time this could not profitably be worked, and Bismarck drew his frontier line across it. Within ten years the invention of a new process of treating the ore made it very valuable, and Alsace-Lorraine became a more acute grievance than ever between France and Germany. Four-fifths of the inhabitants speak German only, but they had formed part of France for over two centuries, and in 1871 they warmly resisted the transfer. France declined to take a plebiscite in 1919, and we do not really know to which country the people wish to belong.

In the flush of victory in 1871 the king of Prussia was at Versailles, in the French royal palace, elected German Emperor (not Emperor of Germany) by the rulers of the various German states. Each of the twenty-five states—the southern states now joining the northern—retained its ruler (kings, dukes, etc.) and its Congress, but the king of Prussia was to be the hereditary Emperor (Kaiser), and there was to be an imperial Congress, the Reichstag, at Berlin. Nominally, as I said, it was based on universal male suffrage, but special restrictions made the representatives of the people powerless. Germany was thus at length unified, with a common coinage and economic system, and it became one of the leading powers of Europe.

The accession of Alsace-Lorraine greatly increased the number of Catholics in the Empire, and from 1870 to 1878 Bismarck had a violent struggle (known as the Kulturkampf, a Fight for Civilization) with them which, at the accession of a new Pope, Leo XIII, ended in a compromise. The Catholics now formed a third of the

Empire, and they organized politically to form the Center Party in the Reichstag. The struggle turned mainly on the control of their schools, the education of the priests, and the institution of civil marriage.

Meantime both parties, the Liberals and the Catholics, were alarmed at the rapid growth of Socialism in the industrial towns, and Bismarck gladly relinquished the *Kulturkampf* to take up the struggle against the Socialists. He in 1878 prohibited Socialist meetings and publications, and expelled Socialists from the Empire; and in the eighties he passed several industrial laws (insurance, old age pensions, etc.) to cut the ground from under their feet. The Socialists, however, continued to advance, and William II (the present ex-Kaiser), who acceded to the throne in 1888, demanded Bismarck's resignation (1890) and annulled his anti-Socialist laws; though he in a few years reverted to the policy of coercion. Meantime Bismarck had secured an alliance with Austria in 1879, and Italy, which was alienated from France, joined in 1882, thus forming the Triple Alliance; to which France, as we saw, responded with an alliance with Russia and an understanding with England. In 1882 also the German Colonial Society was formed. Colonies were secured in Africa, and the Caroline Islands in the Pacific were bought from Spain.

34. THE DECAY OF AUSTRIA

The facts we have already given show how Austria lost the commanding position it had occupied in Europe since the Hapsburgs had become the German Roman Emperors in the fifteenth century. The rise of the western powers, when the Turks cut off the eastern route of commerce and the navigators of the Atlantic coast overran the globe, had lessened the importance of central Europe, but, as we saw, Spain was drawn into alliance with the Empire, which still stretched from Italy to the Netherlands, and Austria remained almost the leading country of Europe until Napoleon shattered its armies and lowered its prestige. Even then, as we saw, Vienna was chosen as the seat of the reconstructing Congress, and Austria directed the reaction from 1815 to 1830.

The steady advance of Piedmont in Italy (which we shall see later) and of Prussia in northern Germany in the course of the nineteenth century completed the downfall of Austria. The French joined the Piedmontese in 1859, but withdrew after a victory over Austria. In 1866, however, the smashing defeat of Austria by Prussia emboldened the Italians, and Austria lost her last hold on Italy. The heavy losses of Austria gave an opportunity also to the Magyars of Hungary. They demanded and obtained that Hungary should be recognized as a distinct kingdom, and from that time until Hungary was declared independent after the European War Austria-Hungary was a Dual Monarchy, the Viennese monarch being separately crowned Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary. Austria still dreamed of revenge on Prussia, and even discussed the question of an alliance with France against it, but Bismarck shrewdly

turned the imperialist ideas of Vienna in the direction of the Balkans, and in 1877, when Russia had defeated Turkey, he got Austria appointed to supervise and administer the Slav provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus another step was taken in the direction of the European War. The Slavs, with the constant support of the Serbs, never settled under the Austrian administration, and in 1908 the two provinces were annexed. The chronic restlessness culminated in the murder of the Austrian Archduke at Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia, in 1914, and this led directly to the European War.

55. THE STRUGGLE IN RUSSIA

The entire record of European history down to 1914 is one of Machiavellian diplomacy, annexation of provinces, shifting of alliances, and constant wars to gain the superior position, while internally it is a story of violent efforts to prevent the education, enfranchisement, and improvement of the condition of the mass of the people. In the case of Russia the internal struggle is the more interesting. As far as external relations are concerned we need note only that the weakness of Turkey was a constant ambition to its statesmen, involving the country in the Crimean War against France and England (1854-5) and a war against Turkey in the Balkans in 1877-8. The other European powers, especially England, prevented Russia from taking Constantinople, and we shall see later how Turkey and the Balkan states were affected by the settlement. From that time Russia began to pose as "the big brother" of the Slav states of the Balkans, which it had been her policy to detach from Turkey, but her expansion across Siberia brought her into hostile relations with Japan. Feeble China was as attractive to the European powers as feeble Turkey. But Japan had meantime become a modern military power, and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 ended, as we saw before, in the victory of Japan. Russia, checked in the east, again looked toward the Balkans.

The internal struggle in Russia was the longest and most severe in the whole of Europe. Alexander I had, as we saw, entertained liberal ideas for a short time and had then cordially joined the reactionary powers. His younger brother and successor, Nicholas I (1825-55), was even more despotic and arrogant, so that by the middle of the nineteenth century Russia was still in a condition of medieval barbarism. Forty million of the peasants were serfs: ninety per cent of the entire population were illiterate and lived in the foulest conditions. In the nineteenth century it was no longer possible to isolate so vast a country completely from civilization, and, in spite of the corrupt secret police and the most truculent sentences, ideas of reform spread amongst the educated class and were passed on to the peasants. There were five hundred riots of the serfs during the reign of Nicholas II. Siberia was packed with rebels in its wildest and most inhospitable regions. The knout was seen daily, and the crowded jails were hotbeds of disease.

The struggle in Russia has come down so close to our own time that most people will understand the character it has impressed

on the different parties. The machinery employed for crushing revolution (which meant any aspiration for education and reform) was so drastic that the very idea of government was hated, and Anarchism or Nihilism—the administration of the country without any central government or body of politicians—became the ideal of the more advanced rebels. Some, the philosophical or peaceful Anarchists, held this as an ideal of national policy to be realized by education, but there was in Russia not the slightest freedom of discussion or propaganda, and the bomb and knife naturally became the arguments advocated at the meetings of the secret societies.

Nicholas was succeeded by his son, Alexander II, who at once announced an era of reform. The serfs were emancipated (1861), and provincial councils (*Zemstvos*) were established, a few schools were opened, the universities were slightly improved, and the restrictions on the press were a little relaxed. In other words, only a few small doses of reform were administered, and they served to sharpen an appetite which the Tsar and his corrupt nobles were unwilling to gratify. The peasants themselves were bitterly disappointed when they found that for fifty years they would have to raise the price of their "emancipation," or the enormous sum given in compensation to great land-owners. In short, within ten years the liberal Tsar turned violently reactionary, and the struggle of Nihilists and the ferocious authorities became worse than ever. Alexander was assassinated in 1881, and his son Alexander III mounted the throne with the intention of draining the last drop of revolutionary blood. Amongst the devices of the new reign was the instigation of "pogroms," or massacres of the Jews, to divert the people's anger from the government. In short, the reign of Alexander III and of his son Nicholas II, the last of the Romanoffs, was one long period of bloody brutality ending in the national disgrace of the defeat by Japan. The reformers then pressed their demands and the reaction was bloodier than ever. In one day (Bloody Sunday) in 1905 the troops killed hundreds and wounded thousands of peacefully demonstrating peasants at St. Petersburg. At this time Lenin and the Social Democrats appeared, dividing in time into those who advocated the full or "big" (*bolschie*) Socialist program, the Bolsheviki, and those who temporarily advocated a "small" (*menshe*) program, the Mensheviki. The former were never the "big" party, though some Russians read their name in that sense. In 1906 the reformers forced the Tsar to grant a Duma (Congress), and the next six years were taken up with a struggle of the government to deprive it of any power. The outbreak of war in 1914 revealed the appalling corruption of the ruling class, and in 1917 the Tsar was forced to abdicate. The advanced Socialists and Communists who were scattered abroad—I met Trotsky in New York on the very day of the Revolution—now flocked to Russia, and a second Revolution put power in the hands of the Bolsheviks.

CHAPTER VI

THE LESSER POWERS



THE reconstruction of the map of Europe in 1919 makes all the earlier movements of frontiers and peoples of little interest, but we may glance at the outline of the history of the smaller countries. The division which I make into greater and lesser powers is, of course, arbitrary and does not involve the question of superiority or inferiority. Small nationalities like Holland and Denmark are in no sense inferior to England or France, but larger population and territory generally mean a more conspicuous position in history and in the development of art and science. We have to remember, moreover, that some of the powers grouped in this chapter as "lesser" were amongst the greater at the beginning of the nineteenth century, while others (such as Italy) have risen to the rank of greater in the course of that century. It is just convenient to arrange the countries of Europe as I have done, and a short section will suffice to give such knowledge of the development of each as is generally useful.

§1. ITALY

We have on different pages seen a little about the making of modern Italy, but it is advisable to bring all the facts together here and show how the country became a single and progressive kingdom instead of "a mere geographical expression," as one of the older statesmen had called it. The restoration of powers after the fall of Napoleon divided Italy into four parts, three of which were thoroughly reactionary. The Austrians held the provinces of Milan and Venice, or the northeast of the country. The Pope, as head of the Papal States, ruled Rome and, roughly, central Italy. Naples and the south formed a separate kingdom—a detached fragment of the Austrian Empire—under one of the most reactionary of European rulers, King Ferdinand. In the northwest was the kingdom of Piedmont, an outgrowth of the Duchy of Savoy in the south of France. As it also held Sardinia, it was often described as the Sardinian monarchy. Its king was the most moderate ruler in Italy.

The story of the unification of Italy in the nineteenth century is a description of the way in which the Piedmontese monarchs, whose capital was Turin, gradually obtained all other territory except the strip of Rome on which the Vatican and St. Peter's stand. We saw how the revolution at Naples and Rome in 1848 was crushed after a temporary success, and the reaction in Naples and the Papal States became worse than ever. The English statesman Gladstone described the ruling of Naples in 1850 as "the negation of God erected into a system of government"—not a happy phrase

seeing that the countries where the reaction was most sanguinary were the most religious—and a more moderate and conservative British minister wrote that the condition of the Papal States was “the opprobrium of Europe.” Brigandage, official corruption, ninety per cent illiteracy in the provinces, rampant crime, almost complete neglect of education, and fierce hostility to liberalism, left the Papal States little superior to Russia by the middle of the nineteenth century. After the failure of the Roman Republic, or its destruction by the French, in 1848, the reaction continued. England and France took the unprecedented step of withdrawing their ambassadors from Naples as a protest against the brutality with which Ferdinand ruled his own country. The horrors of the White Terror which I described in the first chapter were in Italy sustained until 1859.

In that year, as we saw, Napoleon III entered into an alliance with the king of Piedmont, but Catholic opposition, which foresaw that the Piedmontese would attack the Pope, forced him to withdraw after a victory over Austria. Piedmont, however, received a considerable extension of its territory, as four of the central provinces, part of the Papal States, clamored to join it, and, when a plebiscite of the inhabitants was taken, the vote was overwhelmingly in favor of joining Piedmont. Napoleon was rewarded by the annexation to France of the Italian city of Nice, on the Riviera.

In 1860 a revolt broke out in Sicily, and the famous Garibaldi was permitted by the Piedmontese authorities to enlist and arm a thousand volunteers and sail against the 25,000 Neapolitan troops who guarded Sicily. In one of the most heroic campaigns of the nineteenth century Garibaldi and his “thousand,” supported by Italian rebels from every village, swept the organized Neapolitan troops before them and reached Naples. The Piedmontese statesman Cavour now thought it time to act, so as to secure the provinces. The Papal army was beaten, and two more of the central provinces, as well as Naples and Sicily, were added to the Piedmont territory. Again a vote of the inhabitants was taken, and, making every allowance for the abstention of Catholics and the use of influence, the result—two million votes for transfer to Piedmont and only twelve thousand for the Pope—showed that Italy very willingly shook off the inept secular rule of the Papacy.

In 1866, when, as we saw, Austria was engaged with Prussia, the Piedmontese attacked them and won the province of Venice, the last remnant of Austrian rule in Italy. In 1870 Garibaldi again emerged with his volunteers and attacked Rome, but the French still guarded it for the Pope. The French withdrew, however, when the regular Piedmontese armies advanced upon the city, and Italian unity was completed by the capture of Rome. The usual plebiscite was taken, and again we must say, making every allowance for influence or manipulation, that the overwhelming vote for the secular power—130,000 for union and only 1,500 against—registered the general consent of the people. Rome was declared the capital of United Italy, but, to meet Catholic feeling that the Pope ought to be politically independent, the area of the Papal building and gardens

was not taken over as Italian soil. Ever since, however, the Popes have condemned the Italian government, refused to appear in Rome, and declared themselves "prisoners of the Vatican."

§2. SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

I have said that a little knowledge of history will prevent any person from lightly repeating the contemptuous expressions which are sometimes applied to Italians, Spaniards, and Portuguese. All three have made for more than a hundred years a struggle against despotism in which tens of thousands have sacrificed their lives and hundreds of thousands their liberty or fortune. It seemed to the Italians that the path of liberty was at last opened to the modern spirit in 1871, and the country prospered. But the rapid advance of Socialism before the last war and the unscrupulous conduct of many of the politicians of the new kingdom gave a pretext for a reaction. Mussolini and the Fascists, with the connivance of the Vatican—Mussolini's first public action was to present the ancient Chigi palace and library to the Papacy—seized power, and there was, and still is, a truculent persecution of democrats and skeptics. The latter, however, are very numerous amongst the Fascists, and Mussolini vacillates between fear and defiance of the Pope.

Spain also has returned after a hundred years of struggle to a clerical-military despotism. While Ferdinand VII, as we saw, crushed all modern spirit out of his people, the Spanish colonies in America revolted, and one by one (as we shall see in the next volume) won independence. France and Austria showing some disposition to help the Spaniards, President Monroe in 1823 made his famous declaration that European powers must keep their hands off America, and Spain lost nearly the whole of its colonial empire. It was further weakened, after the death of Ferdinand, by a long civil war (the Carlist War, 1833-40) over the succession to the throne. Ferdinand had, before he died, nominated his daughter to succeed him, in defiance of the old Salic law (that women could not rule), and his younger brother, Don Carlos, supported by the Church, disputed the throne. Isabella, who won, returned in time to her father's policy, but her scandalous life and degenerate husband aided the cause of the Liberals, and in 1868 she was deposed. The son of the king of Italy was invited to occupy the throne, but he abdicated in 1873, and Spain proclaimed itself a Republic.

In short, in spite of whole decades of the most violent persecution the Spanish Liberals (or anti-clericals) have repeatedly won the majority in the Cortes and enjoyed power. But the throne, Church, and aristocratic officers of the army (who destroyed the Republic of 1873) have been constantly opposed to them, and the mass of the people were deliberately kept in mediæval ignorance. Twenty years ago fourteen million out of the eighteen million people of Spain were still illiterate, and the rural schools are still few and atrocious. The President of the Madrid Athenæum publicly said in 1903: "Our social condition is barbaric." Cruelty in the remaining possessions of Spain, Cuba and the Philippines, had led in 1898 to American

intervention, and Spain was further reduced and humiliated. The contrast even today with the Mohammedan Spain of the Middle Ages is appalling. Yet the war against men of spirit and modern ideas continues decade after decade, and in each generation Spain produces thousands who are ready to pay the penalty. When Francisco Ferrer was shot by order of court-martial in 1909 I proved ("The Martyrdom of Ferrer") that it was a judicial murder, and Professor Simarro of Madrid University afterwards established the literal truth of my word in a large and learned analysis of the trial ("El Proceso Ferrer"). Under the present dictator, General de Ribera, democrats and skeptics are persecuted as fiercely as ever. I visited the country a few years ago and found it ruled and cowed by a vast army of armed police and soldiers.

In the smaller kingdom of Portugal it was possible for the modernists to prevail. I need not summarize its history in the nineteenth century. As far as it is of general interest it is a record, as in Spain, of a tense and fluctuating struggle of the "whites" and the "blacks" (clericals). King succeeded king in the drastic attempt to root out modern sentiments, and the foul ancient prisons were repeatedly filled with liberals. King Carlos, who ruled from 1889 to 1908, pursued this policy with such arrogance, and his personal conduct was so flagrant, that a republican movement was secretly organized. Carlos was assassinated—to the regret of the republican leaders, as, they assured me, it checked their plans—but in 1911 his son Manuel II was deposed, and Portugal was declared a Republic. The world was astonished to find that the republican government could take the most severe action against the Church without disturbing the country.

§3. TURKEY AND THE BALKANS

In an earlier volume we saw how the Turks were a small Asiatic people who settled in Asia Minor in the twelfth century, embraced Mohammedanism, and in the course of the next few centuries conquered the whole of the ancient Greek Empire as far as the Danube and the old Arab Empire as far as Morocco. In those early days their rulers were progressive and enlightened, but they lapsed into the sensual and selfish ways of the Byzantine monarchs whom they displaced. Since 1453 the Sultans had ruled from Constantinople, from which a corrupt and grasping administration, or system of tax-collectors, spread over the empire. All their lands degenerated, and in their European and Christian provinces there was the additional evil of religious hatred.

The reorganization of Russia in the latter part of the eighteenth century created a new situation for Turkey. Russia and the Balkan States had, as we saw, taken their creed from the Greek Church, and the cry was raised that Russia could not tolerate the persecution of its coreligionists in the Balkans. It was, of course a hypocritical pretext for the acquisition of territory from the weak and demoralized Turks. The Greeks and Rumans were encouraged to rebel against their tyrannical rulers, and at length Russia inter-

vened and forced the Turks to withdraw (1828). Greece was declared independent, and Moldavia and Wallachia (which are now Rumania) became virtually independent. The Serbs had, after a long struggle, secured self-government without independence ten years earlier. It was by this time a fixed and notorious aim of Russian policy to take Constantinople and the old Greek empire, of which it considered itself the heir. In 1853 the Tsar coolly proposed to the English minister that they should divide the Sultan's lands (England taking Egypt) between them. Political morality did not rise above that level even in England at that time, but the English saw that Austria also had ambitions in the Balkans, and rejected the proposal. Russia therefore quarreled with Turkey about the protection of Christians in Palestine, but the "sick man," as diplomatists began to call the Sultan, had the cynical satisfaction of seeing the Christian powers, England and France, fight his battles for him in the Crimean War (1853-4). One issue was that the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia were now permitted to join and form the new kingdom of Rumania: so-called because there had been an extensive Roman colonization of the region in ancient times, and the Rumanians thus profess to be of Roman blood. They are mainly Slav.

The Serbs in 1867 obtained complete independence, and the recognition of the failing power of the Turks lit the spirit of revolt in all their European possessions. The Bosnians and Bulgars stirred. Bosnia and Herzegovina were, as we have already seen, ultimately awarded to Austria, and were transferred to Serbia at the end of the late war. A reform party now arose in Constantinople itself, and these "Young Turks," with European education and a leaven of Parisian skepticism, assassinated the old Sultan. But the new Sultan, Abdul-Hamid II ("Abdul the Damned") overplayed his diplomatic game in pitting the rivalries and cupidities of the Christian powers against each other. He thought that while they quarreled he might freely bludgeon his European subjects into obedience, and Europe soon rang with the cry of "Bulgarian Atrocities." They were very real, and in my boyhood I saw many of the victims, but the Balkan wars have always been conducted with barbarity by all the combatants. I may add that the Turkish soldiers who committed the worst outrages came from the fringe of the empire and were not at all characteristic of the Turkish people. All European writers who have an intimate knowledge of the main body of the Turks in Asia Minor grant them a high character. It is a long tradition of corruption and selfish luxury at the court that ruined their empire.

The Serbs—not Servs or Servians, as is often said, for that word means "slaves"—attacked the Turks in 1876, and were defeated, whereupon Russia took up the quarrel (Russo-Turkish War, 1877-8) and defeated Turkey. The other European powers again intervened to prevent Russia from taking Constantinople, but Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro were now recognized as fully independent states, and Bulgaria had merely to pay an annual tribute which was later abandoned. The Balkan region was now divided into a number of independent Christian principalities, which have

fought each other ever since, and Turkey was left with only a narrow strip of territory, inhabited by Turks, west of the Dardanelles. The ambition of Russia was diverted to Siberia, Persia, and India, and the ambition of Italy began to replace it in the Balkans. Diplomats in eastern Europe tell me that the next war will begin with a struggle of Italy and Serbia for the east coast of the Adriatic, which has many harbors, while there are few of any value on the west coast. In any case the awards of territory, especially to Serbia, at the Versailles Conference in 1919, and the curtailment of Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria, were so gross that the region is still "the cauldron of Europe."

§4. NORWAY AND SWEDEN

One turns with some relief to the northern lands which have not attracted the cupidities of the stronger powers in the same way as the sunny countries and blue waters of the south. The Scandinavian peninsula was, as we saw in an earlier volume, already highly civilized under the kings of Sweden in the later Middle Ages and played a great part in securing religious liberty in the wars which followed the Reformation. A royal marriage kept Norway, as well as Denmark under one monarch until 1814 when, as Denmark had favored Napoleon, Norway was detached from Denmark and added to the kingdom of Sweden. The Norwegians rebelled against the Swedish king and were defeated, but they won a separate Constitution and a large measure of independence. The sovereignty of Sweden has always been resented, and it accounts for the embittered feelings between the sister nations. At the beginning of the twentieth century the agitation for the independence of Norway, which had by this time a literature of world-repute (Ibsen, Bjørnsen, Kielland, etc.), became very strong, and in 1905 Norway declared itself independent. The two nations wisely agreed to refer any future quarrel to arbitration and have no frontier forts. Norway adopted universal adult suffrage (including women) in 1907, Sweden following the example in 1909. The discovery of the use of waterfalls for engendering electrical power has opened a new era of prosperity for the countries, and some of the most advanced social writers of Europe have appeared at Stockholm and Christiania. The geographical isolation which keeps the countries out of war now no longer keeps them out of the commonwealth of culture and ideals.

§5. DENMARK

The centralization of the rule of the three countries in Copenhagen for a long time naturally gave that city considerable prestige and importance which were lowered after the removal of Norway and Sweden. Denmark was compelled also to cede Heligoland to England and to sustain part of the burden of cost of the Napoleonic wars. But the contact with France had lodged modern ideas in the mind of the Danes, and the country fully shared the general

advance in the second half of the nineteenth century. In 1866 a liberal Constitution was adopted, all males over the age of thirty having a vote for the House of Representatives, and a scientific attention to farming brought great prosperity to the little kingdom. In the last decade of the century free universal education was provided, and old age pensions were instituted. Few countries are socially more advanced than Denmark.

56. HOLLAND AND BELGIUM

We saw in an earlier volume how the Netherlands, originally a part of the Holy Roman Empire, were subject to the Spanish crown at the time of the Reformation and rebelled against the ferocious attempts of the Spaniards to prevent them from embracing Protestantism. Holland, we saw, contrived to win its independence. It was not only the more northern and less accessible part for the Spanish troops, but it has a harmonious population, while Belgium is divided between the Teutonic Flemings and the French-speaking Walloons who detest each other. Holland made rapid progress, and its navigators were as bold as any in the conquest of the seas in the seventeenth century. They settled in America, in South Africa, in Australia, and in the islands of the Indian Ocean. In spite of the smallness of the home country and its population it looked at one time as if Holland was to become one of the great powers of Europe. But its naval struggle with England ended in disaster, and England took from it the Cape of Good Hope, or the southern tip of Africa, and other possessions. The Dutch colonists in South Africa, now known as the Boers, retreated northward. Britain claimed a suzerainty over them, and at the end of the nineteenth century attempted to dictate to them about their treatment of British workers in the gold fields. War followed (1899-1900), and the Boer States were annexed to the British Empire. In the East Indies, Holland still has large possessions. Her internal history for the last century has been a record of quiet progress with no events of world-interest. The Constitution was revised in 1848, and religious equality was granted to the Catholics.

57. SWITZERLAND

We saw in the last volume how three of the Swiss cantons, which were originally part of the Holy Roman Empire, rebelled against the tyrannical Austrians and won their independence. Other cantons were won by arms from Austria or were admitted to the Confederation, and at the time of the French Revolution it embraced twenty-two cantons, some speaking French, some German, some Italian. The original inhabitants were Celtic, and their language disappeared in the early Middle Ages, so that there is no "Swiss tongue." In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Switzerland was, though a Republic, by no means a democratic country. The clergy, nobles, and officials held power and resisted the claims of

the mass of the people. This state of things lasted until 1830, when the second French Revolution encouraged the Liberals, and they won universal suffrage in most places. The religious division led to even greater trouble. The French cantons generally and some of the German cantons had remained Catholic, and as late as the middle of the nineteenth century they persecuted the Protestants. A civil war ensued. The Catholic cantons organized in a Separate Confederation, and the other cantons reduced them by force of arms and expelled the Jesuits, the chief advocates of persecution. The whole country was then given a completely democratic Constitution. The voters may pass a measure by plebiscite even if the Federal Congress is opposed to it. Switzerland was also the first country to adopt proportional representation. As the neutrality of the country is guaranteed by the other powers, it was chosen as the home of the League of Nations. Switzerland has largely relied until recent years on its fame as "the playground of Europe," but the development of hydro-electricity now gives it a good prospect of industrial prosperity.

CHAPTER VII

THE GREATEST CENTURY OF HISTORY

THE chronicle of events which I have summarized in the last two chapters will probably tell the reader as much as he cares or needs to know about the way in which the separate countries of Europe developed to their present condition. In later volumes which deal with the history of social ideals, literature, art, and science we shall see other aspects of European development, but the outstanding characteristic of the recent period is the phenomenal progress of life in nearly every respect. The historians who devote long chapters to the wars and successive alterations of the maps of Europe seem to me to leave their readers without a proper appreciation of the most significant event of history: this sudden advance of the race to a higher civilization and the causes of the advance. The questions one finds occasionally raised such as "Are we better than our fathers?" and "Can we change human nature?" are clearly questions which require an historical answer, and they would never be asked if historians chose the right material for emphasis. Pessimistic literature still appears annually, and we read quite serious discussions about the decay of the race and the possibility of a collapse of civilization. That the reader may have a clear and firm conception of what is really happening in Europe—we shall find a corresponding progress in America—it will be advisable to state summarily but in precise language the advance that has been made in the last hundred years.

§1. THE PHENOMENAL INCREASE OF WEALTH

That the application of science has led to such increase of wealth as was never known before in the same space of time will at once be admitted by everybody, but the extent of the improvement is realized by few, though it is one of the facts of history which we can most easily express in precise terms. I have in a recent work ("1825-1925, A Century of Stupendous Progress") fully described the progress in England, and it will be enough here to take it as typical of European progress generally. The chronicle of events which I gave in the last two chapters will warn the reader that some European countries have remained too long in a reactionary and unscientific condition to share this advance (Spain, Russia, the Balkans, etc.), but the figures I give apply proportionately to all the leading countries of Europe.

Economic science appeared in England about the end of the eighteenth century, and there were various attempts to estimate the total national wealth and income. Using what are regarded as the best of these estimates, we find that about a hundred years ago the

total wealth of the United Kingdom was about \$14,000,000,000. It is not easy to estimate a nation's wealth, public and private, and experts are not agreed, but the general opinion is that the wealth of the United Kingdom is now about \$125,000,000,000. The population has in the meantime doubled, and the cost of living is much the same, so that the meaning of the figures is plain, and it is remarkable. Wealth has increased ninefold in a century, while the population has increased only twofold (or a fraction over). Estimates of the national yearly income confirm this. A hundred years ago it was about \$1,500,000,000. Income Tax Commissioners now estimate such income as comes under their notice in Great Britain alone (excluding Ireland) as \$15,000,000,000 a year. As England had already made a considerable advance in industrialization by 1825, and had therefore already greatly increased its wealth, we may suppose that countries like France and Germany have experienced even more than a fivefold increase of wealth, allowing for the growth of population.

Since the development of science is progressive, we have every reason to suppose that this multiplication of wealth will continue in the future, and we thus see that in a very real sense the world has entered upon a new era. But there are special aspects of this increase of wealth which must be carefully noted. Taking Great Britain once more as a typical country, and the most easily studied, we find that of its total wealth considerably more than one-third is now public wealth, or the property of the entire community, locally or nationally. Figures are not available but I should very much doubt if even one-tenth of the national wealth of a hundred years ago was national wealth. It was then overwhelmingly in the hands of the small wealthy and middle class. Now not only do the workers themselves hold (in houses, furniture, banks, Trade Union funds, Co-operative Movement, benefit societies, etc.) a very large capital sum, but the amount owned collectively in Great Britain by municipalities (gas, electricity, and water works, street cars, baths, halls, parks, libraries, markets, public offices and equipment, etc.) and the nation (schools, colleges, roads, service-stations, public buildings, hospitals, museums, art-galleries, etc.) now runs to the colossal sum of about \$50,000,000,000, if we include army and navy. Apart from the peculiar benevolence to the workers of ancient Rome, nothing remotely approaching this was ever before known in history. We must further remember that to pay the cost of public services which were never known before in history (education, sanitation, pensions, insurance, medical service, housing subsidies, etc.) or were miserably inadequate (police, insane hospitals, administration of justice, etc.), about one-sixth of the national income is now appropriated by the entire community. The greater part of this (education, hospitals, parks, baths, public libraries, old age pensions, sick and unemployment insurance, poor relief, etc.) is absorbed almost entirely by the small middle class and the workers.

Thus behind the vague statement which we lightly make to each other about the increase of wealth by the application of sci-

ence there is an historical transformation of the greatest importance, and, since it has been effected by a progressive agency, it means the opening of an entirely new era for the race. Every country of the world will in time fully share this transformation. I noticed it advancing rapidly in Serbia, and it is beginning or has begun in Turkey, Egypt, India, and China. The increase of the world's wealth in the twentieth century will be monumental, and, as I have shown, very considerable progress has been made in the juster distribution of it. In my larger study I have clearly established that the worker and the small middle-class man of Great Britain today receives, on the average, three or four times the income he earned a hundred years ago, works just about half the hours that were worked a century ago, has the power to buy hundreds of things that were completely unknown to his class a century ago, and has in addition the largest share of public services which cost nearly twice the entire national income of a century ago. If historians would give this in precise figures and facts in their manuals of recent history, instead of making brief references to an industrial revolution, they would show a higher sense of proportion. In the last hundred years civilization has risen to a new and higher level, by a sudden and unprecedented advance, and, if the drain of the new wealth by militarism and war can be prevented—or, let us say, when the peoples of the world firmly bid their statesmen suppress all armaments—the life of man will become unimaginably rich and attractive.

§2. THE SOCIAL AND INTELLECTUAL ADVANCE

The reader would find it extremely interesting and helpful to study in detail and in its entirety the advance I have just described, though beyond the special study I have made of the progress in England there is no satisfactory work that I can recommend. In a later volume I will give figures for various countries which will help to make clear the situation. And one sees at once that to call this simply an "economic" development obscures its great human significance. Indeed the diversion of so large a part of the newly created wealth to public purposes is not in any sense economic. This aspect of the change, and others to which I have already referred, remind us of what we may broadly call the social transformation of recent history. I have given a summary of the facts in my Little Blue Book No. 1150 ("The Churches and Modern Progress") and may be content here to state only the general lines.

A century ago the British worker, who had not worse conditions than those of any other country of Europe, had on the average eighty-four working hours a week. Shop-assistants, dressmakers, etc., had the same hours. Children, who generally entered the mills at seven, worked seventy-two hours a week and often more, or twelve to thirteen hours a day for six days a week. Two days in the year only were public holidays, and not one of the workers ever had a summer vacation. We must, of course, remember that other European countries were not yet industrialized, but the agricultural workers were

not better off in these respects, except that they had shorter hours in the winter. The average pay of all was about two and a half dollars a week; of children about twelve cents; of young men and women about a dollar or less. Life was a dismal round of toil, with no time for recreation (and hardly any kind of show to go to) and nothing to read, no insurance against illness or accident, no sanitary or other inspection of buildings, no appeal against the cruelty of masters and foremen. Diet consisted generally of coarse bread, potatoes, cheap fat, and water. Coffee, tea, and sugar were beyond the means of the workers and small shopkeepers (and even teachers). Meat, fruit, milk, eggs, and butter were rarely tasted by them. As I showed in volume No. 9, science has completely transformed the diet of the worker, lit and cleansed his home, given him cheap transport to work—in short, enabled the average worker to buy what could not have been purchased with ten times the wage of his great-grandfather.

It will not be supposed that in pointing out these things I am advocating that we should be content with the state of the world as it is today. I am merely emphasizing that there has been a beneficent and fundamental change in comparison with which all the other advances recorded in history are negligible. I look to the future for increased progress, not only in wealth, but in its distribution, and am disposed to believe that poverty and ignorance will cease before the year 2000. Let me recall to the reader that we have seen in previous volumes that science is just beginning to master the human mechanism as it has mastered the metal machine and the food-growing plants and animals. Those who now sink into poverty from defects of character or physique will be medically treated.

However, let us here keep to the historical facts. As compared with a century ago (and even less) the mass of the people have their working hours reduced by half and have much brighter homes and entertainments. Another contrast is that while a century ago only about one in ten of the mass of the people learned to read and write (generally in cottage schools, from teachers who made two or three dollars a week), and found a heavy government tax and censorship on newspapers if he did learn to read, now all are given a considerable measure of education in fine schools and have a wonderful cheap literature, richly illustrated, at their disposal; and a large proportion receive a secondary education. The Secondary (High) Schools and Technical Schools of England are not free, but they cost a parent only about \$50 a year. There is, moreover, such a provision of scholarships, bursaries, etc., that a high proportion find their way to the universities.

We are so rarely reminded of this contrast of our time with all the centuries that have preceded us that some of my readers will have a feeling that I am not writing "history" in recording these facts. I am, on the contrary, writing the very essence of modern history. The greatest thing that has happened in recent times and in all history is just this transformation of the life of the majority of the race. It was done so gradually that the ordinary historian,

who follows the chronicle of events from year to year, misses the magnitude and significance of it. You will probably agree with me that it matters far more than all the other events of the last hundred years put together. At all events you will realize why I choose to tell the history of recent times in the very unusual way which I follow in this volume.

The very great betterment of the industrial and home conditions of the worker and the extension of education are not the whole story. His entire environment has been changed. The streets a century ago were very rarely paved or drained, only a few of them were lit (by dismal oil lamps), and the policing was rather in the nature of a comedy. Try to imagine what difference has been made to life by one single modern improvement: the draining of the streets. Try to imagine even the larger cities of Europe as late as the eighteenth century devoid of sewers, the garbage and foul water lying in the sultry summer streets, the myriads of unseen discase-bacteria breeding freely on all sides. And this is one of a hundred details in the great nineteenth-century transformation of life.

§3. THE BETTERMENT OF LIFE

As we have seen in an earlier volume, there is a dispute about what is called the materialistic determination of history or the extent to which progress or reaction depends upon economic or material circumstances. It is so very largely a verbal dispute that I do not discuss it. To a materialist, naturally, all things are settled by material causes; but that is a question of philosophy, not of science or history. But this survey of the transformation of life in the last century brings out once more, as so many of our pages have done, the mighty influence of material conditions or environment. For the general level of character has risen, as Lester Ward long ago predicted, with the improvement of the industrial conditions and material surroundings.

Here again I must refer to my other books for the details which prove this. If the reader will glance again at volumes 1, 4, and 9 of this series, in so far as they tell in detail how science has brightened and enriched the lives of all, and if he cares to read the various Little Blue Books in which I describe the extraordinary decrease of crime and improvement of character in most countries of Europe, he will quite understand why I make this betterment of life and character the outstanding fact of recent history. I have shown that in Great Britain and France serious crime is now, in proportion to population, only one-fourth of what it was fifty years ago, when reliable statistics of it began to appear, and that all kinds of crime have materially decreased (Little Blue Book No. 366). Gambling and drunkenness have been reduced just as much. In regard to sex-morals, to which our pessimists usually appeal, we have positive figures or reliable estimates which show that there are, in proportion to population, not one-fifth the loose women in London that there were a century ago, and we have statistical evidence that the graver

offenses (rape, unnatural vice, incest, etc.) have greatly diminished. In this respect, however, we must discriminate. A century ago the overwhelming majority of every nation professed to be Christians yet were flagrantly immoral. Very much of the liberty of our time is based on principle and is not a violation of an accepted moral code.

Refinement of taste and manners has advanced equally. I have spoken mainly of the workers, since it is obvious that any improvement of conditions ought chiefly to affect them, but there has been a notable betterment of the code of life of the wealthy also. In the early nineteenth century the great majority of the "gentlemen" of London got drunk nightly or several times a week. Cardinal Newman records that in his own early experience in the Church of England even ministers generally drank from one to three bottles of wine each at dinner. Amongst military officers drunkenness was appalling, and it was everywhere treated as a joke. In this respect, and many others, there has been a vast improvement. In those days "sport" quite commonly meant enjoying the most brutal fights (always with naked fists, often of women) as well as fights of animals. The sordid conditions of life, the intolerable burden of work, the daily sight of pain, disease and death—for less than half of any community lived to be twenty—the contempt and cruelty of "the upper class," left the mass of the people coarse in taste and violent in conduct to a degree that we cannot imagine. Few of them ever got ten miles away from their squalid quarters, and at the first onset of weakness one was thrown out of the industrial system. A very high proportion of the heavy work was still manual, yet several million married women engaged in it for about two dollars a week. Their children died like flies. One would like to ask some of the writers who carelessly say that science has merely added to our "material comfort" to reflect and estimate seriously to what extent the volume of pain and distress has been lowered in every country in Europe by the progress of sanitation, hygiene, medicine, surgery, dentistry, anesthetics, disinfectants, child clinics, hospitals, rapid transport, and regulation of workshops.

Almost every line I write here ought to be a chapter. One could indeed fill a series of volumes with the things which every man and woman and child for that matter, ought to know about the transformation of life in the last hundred years. Add to the list the ending of the gross political corruption of the earlier part of the century and the recognition that even the worker and his wife have the same right as others to control their destiny. Add, further, the unprecedented growth of movements for social betterment, for the care of the sick poor (hospitals in England and other European countries being mainly supported by voluntary contributions), for the higher education of adults, for the suppression of cruelty to children or animals, for the abolition of war, for international understandings, for the relief of poverty, for the rearing of orphans and housing of widows, and a score of other objects. Add the emancipation of woman, as we have seen, from nearly all her disabilities. You have, if you will read slowly and reflectively each clause of this chapter, evi-

dence of a comprehensive transformation of life which ought to be printed in large type in every manual of the recent history of Europe. We have long passed the high mark of Stoic Rome and Moorish Spain. We have opened a new age of history, and what lies before the race is fairer than the imagination can paint.

CHAPTER VIII

THE MODERN SPIRIT

THIS unprecedented betterment of life is ultimately due to two agencies, the advance of science and what I have called the modern spirit. The share of science is too obvious to need discussion, and in fact I sufficiently pointed it out in the volumes on physics, chemistry, and economic botany and zoology. To it we directly owe, not merely the remarkable brightening and cleansing of life and the incalculable reduction of pain, but also the colossal national wealth without which the transformation could never have been effected. No civilization that ever existed before the nineteenth century could have sustained the cost of our modern social services. I doubt if any but the Roman Empire in its best days or Moorish Spain could have borne the cost of modern education alone, or just one of a score of modern public services. Science had to improve production.

That is clear enough, though I fancy few people ever reflect on it, but we must try to get equally clear about this modern spirit which I claim to be the other great constructive agent. I have repeatedly coupled it with skepticism because no historian who writes candidly about the last hundred years can do otherwise. You will read in every manual of recent European history how in every single country of Europe the clergy solidly supported the throne and the aristocracy during their long and brutal efforts to crush the aspirations which the French Revolution had broadcast. Every single historian will tell you how the Papal authorities behaved exactly like all the other autocratic rulers: how the Church of England unanimously supported George IV (the clergy of the other Churches remaining silent); how the French bishops to a man encouraged Charles X; how the ferocious monarchs of Spain, Portugal, and Austria acted under clerical guidance, and so on in every country. What the historians generally, indeed almost always, fail to point out, though it is just what you would expect in such circumstances, is that the rebels were mostly anticlericals. Few religious men could be expected to stand out against the unanimous authorities of their Churches. The few you find named—Mazzini, Kossuth, Garibaldi, Robert Owen, Fourier, Louis Blanc, Marx, Lassalle, etc.—were all skeptics. If from some specialized manual of social history you pick out a hundred names of the leading fighters for humanity in every country of Europe from 1750 to 1850 (when you paid for your service instead of being paid for it), you will find four-fifths of them, with the evidence about their opinions, in my large "Biographical Dictionary of Rationalists." The few conspicuously orthodox reformers (Wilberforce, Shaftesbury, Howard, etc.) worked in a single field and resisted the general scheme of reform and enlightenment.

Now, I suppose it would be very little use for me to try to con-

ceal from the reader that I am a bit of a skeptic, but I am going to try to analyze this modern spirit, and show that it is a new and profoundly beneficent thing, on broader lines. Remember that American history is apt to mislead on this point, and that is one reason why I keep it strictly for a separate volume. The charter of the rights of man had been won in America before the French Revolution occurred. There was no monarch or aristocracy to fight against. There was no Established Church to ally itself with the ruling caste. The European struggle was very different. It was against the intimately combined despotism of Church and State, as it is in Spain today.

§1. THE SENSE OF PERSONALITY

What I call the modern spirit is therefore not in itself connected with religion, and any religious reader of this work will naturally say at once that he quite understands rebellion against the ecclesiastical authorities of a hundred years ago. Let us get the matter quite clearly. The spirit which broke upon the world in the American and French Revolutions demanded the liberation of the individual from "rule"—an administrative authority set up by the individuals themselves is a very different thing—the education of all, a voice for all in the making of laws and decision of war, freedom to discuss religion and all institutions and traditions, complete liberty of research, a higher wage for the mass of the people, less industrial tyranny, and better conditions of work. The combined Church and State of each country refused these things. Most of them were expressly condemned by the Pope and the Protestant Archbishops.

It is further clear that the fundamental principle of this group of claims is free criticism. Most captains of industry in the first quarter of the nineteenth century protested that higher wages or shorter hours would ruin the industry, yet Robert Owen made a fortune by granting these and many other claims. It was a matter for frank and full discussion, and the workers must be educated to discuss it intelligently. In politics again, the ruling class said that an enlargement of the franchise would ruin the country. So on every point. The mass of the people were to raise no questions, and, if they did raise them, they must meekly accept the assurances of pastors and masters. Men and women were treated as children, not as mature personalities with rights, and they were refused the education that would lift them above childhood on the express ground that, English bishops said, it might make them discontented. It was a sordid and selfish world, a world quite literally of the exploitation of nine for the comfort of one. From the few details I have been able to give here about the political systems and the industrial life, the brutal injustice of that old world can be questioned by none. Yet it was stereotyped by secular and religious authority, and the progress of the world depended on a small minority of brave men and women sustaining under all persecution the right of man to challenge and criticize.

We sometimes still hear that it was all a mistake, that democracy does not work, that Fascism is more profitable to a nation. The fallacy is obvious: cleanse your politics, educate your democratic voters, appoint statesmen instead of politicians, and then try democracy. But by the general consent of the world what was won in Europe in the nineteenth century by the modern spirit was a great victory. "If you are looking for his monument, look around you," as the epitaph of the architect of London's cathedral neatly says. The world is immeasurably better and happier. As to the relation of this modern spirit to religion, ethics, political authority of the modern type, marriage, and so on, complaints are not very enlightened. The modern spirit means, not merely discussion and criticism, but enlightenment first. No one proposes to turn round and muzzle the defenders of old traditions and institutions as they once muzzled their opponents. It is very bold to suppose that in two generations this modern spirit of challenge has already discovered every unsound piece in the fabric of traditional institutions, and that to examine and challenge any further is sacrilege. The foundation of every law and authority should be, not underground, but plain in the eyes of all men, and they have more chance of respect. A generation cannot be expected to applaud its fathers for shattering an obvious despotism and then to accept the despotic authority of those fathers over its own life.

§2. THE REMAINING PROBLEMS

Therefore I close my survey of the history of the old world on a note of admiration. Some philosophic reflection will be at least pardoned, if not expected, by every reader now that I have brought him from the dim beginnings of history in Crete, Egypt, and Babylon to the threshold of the future. What supreme lessons can be drawn from it? What were the causes of those profound reactions which time after time undid the constructive work of the race and postponed this higher civilization which we are now inaugurating? Surely we have seen plainly that they were war, the blunders of despotic rulers, and the detention of the great majority of the race in a state of ignorance and serfdom. What were the agencies at work in those periods when some part of the race advanced materially in the direction of our modern civilization? The cultivation of a genuine spirit of service and justice in the rulers (the Stoic emperors, for instance, or Spanish Moors), the eager pursuit of free research, the enlightenment and prosperity of the mass of the people. And if this at times occurred under despotic rulers, it soon came to an end because a dynasty of despots usually supplies five fools to one wise man. If the reaction sometimes (as in Athens) occurred under a democracy, the essential fact leaps to the eye that it was a quite uneducated democracy.

With our modern science and our strong sense of personality or personal rights we have brought the race to the threshold of a new age. The gravest defects of our time are plainly due, not to

these new elements of our civilization, but to the fact that we have as yet only partially applied them to life. The settlement of international quarrels by wholesale killing is the worst of our remaining blunders, and the system, and the military conditions which facilitate it, are an affront to science. If science were some new goddess that had taught men in recent times how to wrest a tenfold greater wealth out of the earth, I should imagine her weeping at the colossal waste of that wealth in a modern war. And the fact that we idly leave the decision of these things to statesmen and diplomatists is an affront to our modern spirit. We have risen from our knees before the old monarchs, but we have not yet fully realized that statesmen and policemen are our servants, the servants of the community, and that no law is morally valid which the majority of us do not see to be just a regulation for the protection of the common weal. Our failure to assert our mastery over the political machinery we set up, to study its defects and constantly improve it, is the second most costly of our blunders.

In short, most of our remaining evils betray only that we are proceeding too slowly in our application of science to life. The fundamental problem of civilization is to give as much comfort and happiness and freedom to each individual as is consistent with the comfort and happiness of all others. We are moving nearer to the ideal. We are nearer to it than the world ever was before. But it is just in regard to this fundamental problem that we desert science and revert to the happy-go-lucky methods of the Middle Ages. We have reached a new stage of evolution, but we are still only on the threshold, and our old habits cling to us. That army of men whom we have now followed across this planet from the dawn of prehistoric time to the new era was guided and stimulated by conditions. Even when it was led by wise monarchs or thinkers they had no vision of past or future. The origin of the race was as obscure as its goal. The race has now, in its thoughtful members, entered upon the stage of deliberate, self-conscious advance toward a goal fixed by itself. The whole world is drawing together in a new conception of life, a new sense of personality, a new zeal for the final conquest of pain, brutality, injustice, and untruth. That is a sober historical characterization of "modern times."

BOOKS TO READ

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J. H. Robinson, **An Introduction to the History of Western Europe**, 1926, 2 vols.

J. S. Schapiro, **Modern Times in Europe**, 1926, 516 pp. (excellent summary of last 200 years).

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F. Schevill, **A History of Europe from the Reformation**, 1926, 728 pp.

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