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Published weekly at 229 E.
Forest Ave., Girard, Kans. Single
copies 5c; by the year \$1.50
Canadian and foreign. Entered
as second-class matter at the
Girard, Kans. postoffice.

NUMBER 1769

In the World of Books

Weekly Reviews and Other
Literary Ruminations
Isaac Goldberg

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OH, HELL!

Fighting the Devil in Modern Babylon. By Dr. John Roach Straton. Boston. The Stratford Company. \$2.50.

This is one of the funniest joke books I have seen in decades. The more serious the Rev. Dr. gets, the better the show that he puts on. If sight-seers and sound-listeners, on a joy trip to New York, knew their onions, they would really avoid the dance halls, the prize fights, the cabarets and the other objects of Straton's fulmination; instead, they would hie themselves to the Calvary Baptist Church of the Modern Babylon and get an eye-full and an ear-full of Straton himself.

Perhaps this may help to explain Straton's animus against the Devil. The Devil is his chief competitor. And lest you believe that the Rev. Dr. speaks in metaphors, he is there to assure you that the Devil is a person, not a figure of speech.

Well if you want a little change—literally, a hell of a time—dip into these pages and then return, with renewed zest, to your special form of paganism. Straton and his type are great advertisers for Lucifer.

TWO NOVELS

The World's Delight. By Fulton Oursler. New York. Harper's. \$2.50.
Black Roses. By Francis Brett Young. Same publisher; same price.

Oursler has written a fine book—one well worth reading, and filled from cover to cover with adventure and insight. I say a fine book, and not a fine novel or a fine biography. He might have done either; as it is, he seems to have fallen between the two stools. At the end of the book the biographer pays tribute to the proreption by listing his authorities; at the same time he disclaims the purpose of biography and demands the rights of the novelist. He would have his cake and eat it. The aesthetic in me—I fear one is sometimes present—would have preferred an out and out biography of Adah Isaacs Menken. Oursler would have had scope for his psychological sense; he could have speculated upon causes and effects; the reality of the woman was so novel as to place it in the first place that it needed but little the condiment of fiction.

Yet, as I say, the book has its own fascination, especially in the early days, when the woman goes through one passion after another, as if love were a circus horse to be tamed beneath her heel. As it was, La Menken dashed about the circus-ring of life, whipping and whipped in turn by the lash of an ardent temperament and an over-vaunting ambition. Her encounters with the great and the near-great, her thwarted motherhood, her strange adoption of the Jewish faith after she became the wife—not for long—of the music-teacher Menken whose name she retained to the end of the chapter—these are but episodes in a career rich with associations. La Menken was something of a puzzle. Oursler chose to concentrate upon the beautiful picture.

Young's "Black Roses" is a reminiscence tale of passion in Naples. A budding artist, born of an eccentric English father and an Italian mother, falls in love with his young landlady. Comes the plague, as the movie titles used to say, and writes Finis to friendship and love. The tale is well told, though with no special mastery of character or narrative; it is an honest document.

WHICH WAY PROGRESS?

The Drift of Civilization. A Symposium. New York. Simon & Schuster. \$3.

It was a happy idea to gather, into a single volume, the essays contributed by writers from all over the world to the Fiftieth Anniversary edition of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. This was the first newspaper founded by Joseph Pulitzer, and it appeared initially on December 12, 1878.

Among the contributors who seek to look into the future of Man, of Science, and of America, are Wells, Einstein, Croce, Dean Inge, Keyserling, Ferrero, Bertrand Russell, Maxim Gorky and Hans Driesch; native sons are represented by Fishbein, Paul de Kruif, Sidney Hillman, James Harvey Robinson, and others. In all, a galaxy. The essays are short and pithy, and are especially adapted to desultory reading.

THE WAR BEHIND THE FRONT
Class of 1902. By Ernst Glaeser. New York. Viking Press. \$2.50.

Here, in an excellent translation

The American Freeman

Formerly The Haldeman-Julius Weekly---Published Every Saturday Throughout the Year

HALDEMAN-JULIUS PUBLICATIONS, GIRARD, KANSAS

COMING!

in an early issue
That Horrible
French Revolution
By Joseph McCabe

OCTOBER 26, 1929

by Willa and Edward Muir, is a novel of the war behind the German front—the war as, it appeared to those at home who were either too old or too young to be called to the colors. Glaeser himself was one of the class of 1902—those born in that year and due for service at the time of the armistice. There is, as in everything that touches adolescence, something of the idyll about this story; yet it is a red idyll, with the sound of doom in the distance. To be sure, there is more of love, or, at least, of youthful initiation, than there is of battle. It is a haunted love, such as descends upon humanity in times of terror and pestilence, as if life, threatened with extinction, must taste before it is too late of the wine that runs in blood. The youngsters behind the front are more concerned, at first, with the great mystery of love; they catch whispers from their elders; they make awkward investigations; before they know it, they have been seduced, and are almost as much in the dark as ever.

The war is another mystery, as is the intelligence of those elders who run the world. Why? Why?

It is refreshing to see this picture through the eyes of inquisitive youth. The depiction has also its nascent tragedy. The tragedy of patriotism, the tragedy of parental evasion, the tragedy of mass hysteria. At every step, youth is victimized by authority unworthy of its grave responsibility. Life, which could be so beautiful for youth, becomes so ghastly. The high-sounding clichés of war take on, gradually, their true terror. Our children, after the first wild days of enthusiasm, catch sight of death; they feel the gnawings of hunger; they catch the overtones of despair from their mothers and their fathers; war throws off its gay disguise and stands forth as the mad ogre that it is.

"What have you done to our youth?" This is the question that rings from the pages of "All Quiet on the Western Front" and from such red idylls as "Class of 1902." There is an even greater slogan than "They Shall Not Pass!" It is "This Shall Not Be!"

Here and there are consciously literary touches in the narrative. On the whole, however, "Class of 1902" is as honest as a child's smile. In it speaks not only the betrayed youth of Germany, but the youth of the world. This youth that might have grown up into great artists, musicians, poets, bringers of joy to harassed humanity—what have you done to it? What evil message have you written in its blood? What have you returned for the love of which you robbed it? What have you bought at the price of its blasted bodies?

THE HAPPY POLYGRAPH

Once, during the past few years, I wrote to Haldeman-Julius intimating that he was allowing his editorial labors to interfere with his creative functions. I asked his wife and himself for another "Dust." I feared that he had forgotten those cameos of "The Color of Life"—this collection contains some of the best things he has done—and that he would sit back to contemplate the world through wreathes of tobacco smoke.

I am happy to say that my fears were unwarranted.

First, as practical answer to my doubts, came "The First Hundred Million"; then, in rapid succession, "The Outline of Bunk," "Violence" and now, "The Big American Parade." And I don't know what may be brewing in his witches' cauldron. The jacket of "Violence" reports progress on a new novel, "The Best People." It's a piquant title, and one doesn't have to be told that the book will not be squeamish.

Haldeman-Julius is fortunate in his publishers. Both Simon & Schuster, of New York, and The Stratford Company of Boston, have issued his writings in solid, dignified fashion, making the binding and the typography an outward token of what they thought of the text itself. "Violence" has in it the making of a fine "movie"; so, for that matter, has "Dust." I wonder that one of the more conscientious companies doesn't consider these stories. As for "The Big American Parade," it is a worthy companion of "The Outline of Bunk," in which the American problem—a complicated matter, to say the least—is lit up with a sober outlook and a civilized humor.

Haldeman-Julius fans do not have to be told much about its contents. Much of it appeared in the columns of The American Freeman. Here it is, however, in pleasant form, an octavo volume of more than 400 pages, tastefully bound in gold on blue, with excellent typography, selling low at \$3.

THE NEW BRITANNICA

Well, there they are, the twenty-four volumes, neatly ensconced in their shelf, which happens to be

one compartment of a duplex table. That is, on the other side of the table that goes with the books is a shelf that holds as many books again as the Encyclopaedia Britannica, in its new avatar, comprises. A very serviceable table, indeed—much more so than any other of the contrivances that have been presented, heretofore, to subscribers. My own set—it was paid for at the regular price, more's the pity—is in the blue binding; it is meant for hard usage as well as for looks, and answers to both demands. May the inside be, for its purpose, as good as the exterior.

There are some 1,000 pages to each volume, with an Atlas and an Index making up Volume 24. Obviously, it will take a little time before I can read the set and write up an adequate review. This is the 14th edition of the great literary institution, and it has been rewritten and reset, so we are assured, from A to Z. It has also been "humanized." That, to be sure, may prove a dubious virtue; it is too early for me to say. Too much "humanization," as practiced by many current Outlines, is in the direction of a false simplicity. However, the theory behind the 14th Edition is sound, and I can only hope that it proves to work well when I begin to dig into the various specialties about which I am competent to speak.

I have made a bad start. I peeked into what they had about Yiddish—the language and the literature. It is not too good. Indeed, in one instance I suspect that the writers of the article did not even read the authorities that he lists. I was amused, also, to find my book on "Brazilian Literature" carelessly listed in the bibliography of Spanish-American letters; the writer, of course, knows the difference between Spanish and Portuguese. On the other hand, all reference to my "Studies in Spanish-American Literature," which was translated into Spanish almost immediately upon its appearance, and used by Spanish and Spanish-American students, is absent. Little oversights like this are bound to multiply in a work of twenty-four volumes. But if every specialist discovers, in his own field, oversights such as these, he will begin to wonder what the writers were about.

I shall return to the subject of the 14th Edition. And if there is any fault to find, I promise you not to be bashful in reporting it. For it is precisely such an institution as this that should be constantly subjected to the closest scrutiny.

A MASTERLY TRAGI-COMEDY

The Methodist Faun. By Anne Parrish. New York. Harper & Brothers. \$2.50.

Miss Parrish is one of my favorite contemporary novelists. She has, as anyone who read "All Kneeling" will remember, not only a sense of humor, but a deep yet unostentatious insight into the foibles of human nature. A real sense of humor is often associated with a sense of tragedy, and it is in her latest novel that Miss Parrish presents these qualities in a blend that heightens one's sense of living.

"The Methodist Faun" might easily have degenerated into a tale with an obvious thesis. This dreamy chap, born of prosaic parents into a most prosaic world, and cursed with a passion for beauty that he himself cannot understand, might have been made into a stuffed dummy bearing the neatly printed label of his tribe. He has a vision of the kind of girl he would like to marry; she toys with him, however, in her misunderstanding of his nature. When he does marry, he is tricked by that very Nature which he loves, into another long stretch of prose.

Clifford Hunter was not meant for the heights. His aspirations, like life itself, betrayed him. But his life, like so many minor lives, might have been filled with a beauty that brought him at once excitement and peace. The right woman would have stirred him to fruitful effort—would even have raised the stream of his imagination higher than its source—would have, in a word, created a new Clifford. It needn't have been a wonderful woman; certainly there was nothing wonderful about the Catherine who entranced him. The women we love are never the women whom the world sees; we recreate them in the image of an ideal. As for Martha, the woman whom Clifford married "on the rebound," as the vulgar—and veracious—saying has it, she was not to blame for Clifford's debacle. This, indeed, is the sadly beautiful thing about "The Methodist Faun": nobody is to blame. But when, during the delirium of convalescence from pneumonia, Clifford wandered out amid the snow of his beloved fields to his death, he was but obeying an impulse that moved him even when he was well. It was a judgment upon his own life and upon life in general. The tawdry little Methodist esthete rejected the only life that he could know.

The delicacy of Miss Parrish's

treatment is as rare as her understanding of the adolescent and the groping artistic soul. Before we know it, we are led by her laughing intuition to the very brink of the grave. It comes as a shock, yet, thinking back, we realize how truly inevitable the outcome was. A hundred little touches attest to her understanding of the lesser psychology of sex, of the motives that move men and women in their pursuit of one another, of the numerous possibilities that are slain by a chance word or glance.

"The Methodist Faun," in locale, in technique, in plot, is as original as it is effective. It reveals new depths in its author, and a new lightness of touch, even when dealing with the tragic futilities of living. It is infinitely human, and a little masterpiece of tragi-comedy.

"AUS HERE!"

Up to Now. An Autobiography, by Alfred E. Smith. New York. The Viking Press. \$5.

I have been running through this opus as it appeared in the columns of the *Saturday Evening Post*. Al in print is as simple and effective as he was over the radio during the presidential campaign. There is little that is really exciting in his career; it is his personality that ingratiated him to the millions who voted for him, and it is that same personality that carries the reader through these pages. In my contrary fashion, I was more interested in Smith the amateur actor than in the politician. There was a good deal of sentimentality about Smith during the campaign, and many radicals forgot their principles in allowing themselves to be captured by the good fellow in the man. They, especially, should read this book to see how well Smith, as a personality, is justified. As to politics, I resign from the obligation to discuss them here.

One suggestion of Smith's will be sure to receive wide discussion. "There are millions of people in this country," he writes, "who belong to no party. They like parts of the Republican platform and they like parts of the Democratic platform"—what about those who like parts of the Socialist platform, and the other minority platforms?—"and when they finally make their decision they are choosing the man who comes nearest to their general ideas of what is best for the country. It cannot be said that they are represented in Congress by any party."

Therefore, urges Smith, the defeated candidate for presidency receiving the second highest number of votes should become a United States Senator at large, holding office during the term of his successful opponent. The idea might be carried further, so as to win representation for all minority parties.

Who Began the World War? Harry Elmer Barnes

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[Concluded from last week.]

It has been contended that the Russian general mobilization was not precipitate, and that Russia had to mobilize at once to save Serbia from imminent destruction at the hands of the Austrian army. This is nonsense. The Russians knew in 1914 that the Austrian military plans involved an indirect campaign against Serbia which would make it impossible to invade Serbia until more than two weeks after the Austrian declaration of war against Serbia. There was, therefore, plenty of time for Russia to mobilize after diplomacy had failed.

As it had been frankly admitted and assumed by French, Russian and English military authorities for a generation that a general Russian mobilization would inevitably mean a European war, there can be no question that the Russian militarists were as determined to bring about a general European conflict as was Austria to invade Serbia unless Serbia capitulated. The Tsar was certainly in favor of peace, and when the Kaiser telegraphed him, on the 29th, protesting against the impending Russian general mobilization, he offered it suspended, but the next day the militarists won over the well-minded and bewildered monarch to the final and fatal decision upon general mobilization. He was unquestionably a well-intentioned and pacifically inclined ruler, but unintelligent, vacillating and confused before the impending calamity. The Grand Duke Nicholas and the strongest elements in the court group were extremely enthusiastic for war, as were the military circles, though there seems some probability that the Minister of War, Sukhomlinov, lost his nerve in the face of the crisis. It was for a considerable time believed by scholars that the Russian Foreign Minister,

Sazonov, was really in favor of mediation, and was brought around to the war view only by full realization of the menace of this policy to the Russian ambitions in the Near East. More thorough investigation, and particularly the marshaling of the evidence in the recent book by Major Frantz, has unquestionably established the fact that Sazonov had, by the time of Poincaré's departure from St. Petersburg, become thoroughly converted to the aggressive attitude and, throughout the crucial period of the last two weeks in July, was aligned with the military party in the Russian capital. As Professor William L. Langer expresses it in the final authoritative judgment of Russian responsibility for the War: "Sazonov wholeheartedly supported the military men in the demand for general mobilization. . . . Sazonov did nothing to avert the catastrophe, but backed the Serbs to the limit and allowed things to take their course." It need not be further emphasized at this point that among all the prominent Russians of the time the zeal of Izvolski, now back in Paris, for a European war was matched only by that of the Grand Duke Nicholas at home.

All of the above might be true, and yet Russia might stand vindicated if it could be shown that she was determined upon war in a legitimate cause. The excuse set forth by Russia in 1914 was the allegation that Russia was traditionally and morally bound to protect all the Slav peoples of Europe. In the light of the fact that it has been the Russian Foreign Minister, Izvolski, who had suggested the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, and that Russia had offered Turkey an alliance against the Slav Balkan states in 1911, it can scarcely be held that Russia's title to act as protector of the Serbs can command much respect. On this issue we might offer the opinion of the decidedly anti-German British Ambassador to France in 1914, Sir Francis Bertie. Writing in his diary on July 26, 1914, Bertie said: "Russia comes forward as the protectress of Serbia; by what title except on the exploded pretensions that she is, by right, the protectress of all Slavs? What rubbish!" On July 27 he wrote to Sir Edward Grey: "The French Government . . . should be encouraged to put pressure on the Russian Government not to assume the absurd and obsolete attitude of Russia being the protectress of all Slav States whatever their conduct, for this will lead to war." Bertie also pointed out to Grey on the 25th that even Bienvenu-Martin, the French acting-minister for Foreign Affairs, admitted that the Russian protection of Serbia was no adequate ground for French intervention: "[Bertie] felt sure that public opinion in England would not sanction a war in support of Russia if she, as protector of Slavs, picked a quarrel with Austria over Austro-Serbian difficulty. He (Bienvenu-Martin) admitted, but not as Minister, that it would be difficult to bring French public opinion to fighting point in such a case as present one."

IV. FRANCE ENCOURAGES THE RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION

Inasmuch as Poincaré had probably been the chief factor and influence in leading the Russians to determine upon an immediate and actively aggressive policy in July, 1914, it was scarcely to be expected that France would vigorously oppose the Russian preparatory and mobilization measures, even though French authorities knew that, once they were started in real earnest, there was absolutely no possibility of preventing a general European war. Poincaré returned from St. Petersburg fully convinced that war was inevitable. We now have most of the dispatches exchanged between the French government and the Russian government at St. Petersburg on the subject of the military measures. There is not a single telegram in this collection which reveals any French effort whatever to restrain the Russian military activity. Viviani's telegram on the morning of July 30th only cautioned against allowing the Germans to become aware of Russian mobilization and to start counter-mobilization. In fact, the most important telegram was one sent by Izvolski on July 30th, stating that the French Minister of War had suggested that the Russians might well speed up their military preparations, but should be as secretive about this activity as possible, so that more time might be gained upon Germany and not open indictment or excuse be given to the Germans for mobilization on their part. In a number of important telegrams Izvolski described to his home government the high enthusiasm of the French government and military circles with respect to the impending war. About one a. m. of the morning of August 1, Izvolski telegraphed home that the French Ministry had revealed to him their great exuberance and enthusiasm over the final decision for war, and

asked him to request the Russian government to direct their military activities against Germany rather than Austria. And at this same time Izvolski was joyously and enthusiastically admitting his part by openly boasting: "C'est ma guerre."

During the War the French persistently called attention to a certain phase of their pre-war military activity as a definite proof of their pacific intent. This was the famous French order of July 30, directing the withdrawal of the frontier troops in certain sections to a line about six miles (ten kilometers) back of the boundary. As the French patrols were left at the border posts, so that they could detect any aggressive advances on the part of the Germans, who in fact had not yet mobilized at all, this movement of troops did not in any way whatever reduce the military efficiency of the French defenses against German invasion. The patrols were in a position to report any advance movement of German troops, and the French armies could have been marched over the intervening six miles in an hour. As an actual matter of fact, this withdrawal was a positive aid to French military preparations, as they carried on extensive preparatory activities back of the screen of the six-mile line. We now know that the whole thing was primarily a picturesque gesture to aid Sir Edward Grey and the "strong" members of the English Cabinet in duping the English Parliament and people by convincing them of the pacific and defensive attitude of France. It is explicitly stated in the new British documents that the withdrawal was undertaken to influence British opinion. The French authorities recognized clearly, as their dispatches of the time indicate, that if the English people had any serious suspicions of aggressive Franco-Russian action, there would be great difficulty in getting the English nation enthusiastically into the War on the side of France and Russia, and it might even have been difficult to get the English Cabinet to decide upon war. It is also necessary to remember that the withdrawal gesture was further designed to produce a favorable opinion of French official action in the minds of the French and Italian people, in order that the French might rally loyally and the Italians refuse to join Austria and Germany. There is, thus, no substantial evidence that the group in charge of French policy in July, 1914, took any significant steps whatever to avert the great catastrophe, and there is an overwhelming body of proof to support the position that they did everything possible to make the War inevitable.

Another famous scheme of Poincaré to make war both certain and relatively safe for the Entente was his appeal, first to Lord Bertie and then directly to George V, to have England declare her unconditional solidarity with France and Russia, on the ground that this would frighten Germany out of her aggressive plans and preserve peace. He further told the King that France had from the beginning put pressure on Russia for moderation and that Russia had at all stages honored such advice. The direct opposite is, of course, true, namely, that from the first, France had encouraged Russian aggressiveness, and that on the 27th Sazonov had warned both France and England that Russia would tolerate no suggestions of moderation. Moreover, it was Russia which needed restraint at this time if peace was to be preserved. Lord Bertie penetrated this sham with great clarity and precision. In a telegram to Grey on July 30, he said: "The French instead of putting pressure on the Russian Government to moderate their zeal expect us to give the Germans to understand that we mean fighting if war breaks out. If we gave an assurance of armed assistance to France and Russia now, Russia would become more exacting and France would follow in her wake."

The French authorities would probably have encountered great difficulty in carrying through this war policy if they had gone through the usual constitutional process of putting up the matter of the declaration of war to the Chamber of Deputies, but this Poincaré and his associates carefully avoided. The President and the Ministry determined arbitrarily upon war, and, after its declaration, endeavored with success to justify their acts to the Chamber. It needs to be pointed out here that France went beyond the terms of the Franco-Russian military convention. This promised French aid only in the event of a prior Austrian or German general mobilization against Russia, whereas, in 1914, Russia had ordered full mobilization before either Germany or Austria had ordered mobilization against Russia. France was not technically obligated to aid Russia under the terms of the military convention; what bound her was Poincaré's blank cheque given during his visit to St. Petersburg. This fact probably made Poincaré all the more loath to put the

matter of the declaration of war before the Chamber of Deputies. The French government disdainfully rejected all British and German neutrality proposals. The one great Frenchman living at the time who might have exposed Poincaré and his policy and have aligned the majority of sane French pacific opinion against such a foolhardy determination upon war, was the socialist leader Jean Jaures. But he was assassinated by a militant, patriotic and fanatical supporter of the Poincaré policy before he could take any effective steps in this direction.

VI. GERMANY ENDEAVORS TO RESTRAIN AUSTRIA AND PRESERVE PEACE

As soon as Germany discovered that Austria was apparently determined to go ahead with the Serbian campaign, regardless of consequences, and discerned that these consequences, due to the Franco-Russian procedure, would be likely to bring on a general European war, the Berlin authorities began a feverish, if belated, effort to put pressure upon those in charge of matters at Vienna, in order to restrain Austrian activity and secure some settlement of the situation which would prevent involving all the Great Powers in war. There is little reason to feel that the German authorities, while they may have regarded the Austrian ultimatum as too severe, were inclined to be at all worried about the vigorous Austrian policy in Serbia, provided this did not bring on a general conflict. There is, on the other hand, the slightest particle of evidence that they were willing to have a European war precipitated over the Balkans, if the Austro-Serbian conflict could possibly be localized. The activities of the German government from July 27 to 29 were concentrated upon the effort to delay the Russians in the matter of intervention in the Austro-Serbian affair, and upon discriminating cooperation with Sir Edward Grey, with the aim of bringing about mediation and arbitration between Russia and Austria. Both efforts failed. The Russian military group, now in undisputed control of Russia, refused to be turned aside from their determination upon war. Likewise the Austrian authorities, equally set upon going ahead with the punishment of Serbia, refused to heed the Kaiser's admonitions, and even declined to answer some of his telegrams containing the suggestion and offer of mediation. By the 30th the Berlin authorities became highly alarmed at the prospect of war, and Bethmann-Hollweg sent a very insistent telegram, warning Austria that unless she delayed and abated her policy in Serbia the responsibility for a European war might be laid upon her shoulders. On the same day the Kaiser exclaimed in exasperation that he and his Chancellor had been asses to put their necks into a noose through the blank cheque given to Austria on the 6th of July. That the German militarists were, however, in sympathy and collusion with the Austrian war party is apparent from telegrams sent by Von Moltke to Hotzendorf at the height of the crisis, urging Conrad to stand firm in his military preparations, in spite of the pressure for mediation and peace by the Kaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg. These Moltke telegrams, however, had no influence on the Austrian civil government in 1914.

We now know that the Austrian authorities viewed this German intercession for peace and mediation with little seriousness and were thoroughly determined that nothing short of apparent British intervention should turn them aside from the long-awaited opportunity to discipline Serbia and get the Balkan situation under control. What Germany might have done still further, in the way of attempting to restrain Austria, cannot be said, as by this time the Russian mobilization had been ordered. As soon as this had been discovered by the Germans the only feasible German strategic policy was to warn Russia that the continuation of Russian mobilization must be followed by a German declaration of war, a thing which the Russians from the beginning had known would be the case. One of the chief myths embodied in the Entente propaganda during the War was the allegation that, at the close of July, 1914, Austria was showing signs of weakening in her aggressive policy and was exhibiting a willingness to accept the Entente proposals of mediation, when Germany, fearing lest she should lose the opportunity to precipitate World War, rushed into the breach and brutally and wantonly declared war against Russia. Nothing could be further from the actual facts in the circumstances. Not until July 31 was Austria in the slightest diverted from her original aggressive determination, and, until Germany was confronted by the Russian mobilization, she made sincere efforts to avert any general European conflict over the Serbian episode. When Austria finally altered her policy and agreed to mediate the Serbian

issue on July 31, her change of attitude was due chiefly to the growing probability of British intervention. This Austrian concession came too late to avert the general European war, because the Russian mobilization had been ordered the day before and made a world war inevitable.

When the Kaiser learned of the Russian mobilization on the 19th, he telegraphed the Tsar, urging him to suspend the mobilization, and warning him that if it was not suspended, Germany would be compelled to declare war upon Russia. The Tsar was obviously impressed and issued an order suspending the Russian mobilization, but, as was pointed out above, the next day the militarists once more induced him to sanction the mobilization order, and from that time the War was actually on. Some have urged that Germany should have contented herself with mere counter-mobilization against Russia. But every European military expert of any competence whatever has fully recognized that this policy would have been fatal for Germany, surrounded on both sides by powerful foes, and having as her chief security against the greater Russian numbers her superior mobility and power to strike with rapidity. As Professor Langer has well stated this crucial issue:

"As for the principle that mobilization means war, it seems downright incredible that even a Frenchman could think that Germany would allow the concentration of the enormous Russian army on her frontiers, with every chance that the French army would also be put on a war footing, and then throw away the only chance of German success, which depended upon speedier mobilization of an inferior number of troops. A German statesman who neglected to answer a Russian mobilization in 1914 by the opening of hostilities would have been guilty of criminal neglect."

The Franco-Russian authorities had fully reckoned with this fact, as it had been a basic consideration in their strategy to recognize that general Russian mobilization would inevitably be followed by a speedy German declaration of war. The Kaiser's rapid and definite effort to avert the Russian general mobilization stands out in sharp contrast to the complete absence of any such attempt on the part of Poincaré. Also the admitted perturbation, if not dismay, of the Kaiser in signing the war orders was something far different from the exuberance and enthusiasm of Izvolski and of Poincaré and his associates when they recognized that the war was on at last.

It has frequently been stated that Germany moved very slowly in restraining Austria and that her restraint came "too late," in any event. As an actual matter of fact, Germany moved with great swiftness in endeavoring to hold back Austria just as soon as it became apparent that the Austrian action might involve Europe in war. If her action was "too late," it was such only because of the precipitate and premature Russian general mobilization. As we have seen, Russia's hasty and fatal action was in no sense justified, as the Russians knew that Austria could not invade Serbia for more than two weeks after July 28, when Austria had declared war against Serbia. Furthermore, French and Russian criticism of the German restraint as "too late" possesses little weight, when we reflect that France made no effort whatever to restrain Russia and that England did not attempt to hold back either France or Russia.

VII. ENGLAND REFUSES FRANCE AND RUSSIA

As to England, it seems certain that, along with Germany, she was one of the two Great Powers involved in active conflict in August, 1914, which desired to preserve peace in the crisis. She was unquestionably definitely committed to France and Russia in what was, for all practical purposes, a defensive alliance, although Asquith and Sir Edward Grey had repeatedly denied this when questioned in the House of Commons. There is, however, nothing to lead us to believe that if he had not been bound by fatal agreement with France and Russia, Sir Edward Grey himself would have preferred war to peace in July, 1914, though unquestionably Winston Churchill and certain of the naval clique, together with Bonar Law, Maxse and the conservative nationalists were eager for war.

The recently published British Documents prove definitely enough that England was not bound to enter the War by an unequivocal and binding treaty obligations with France or Russia. There were in 1914 some Englishmen who held that England was at least bound by a debt of honor to aid France. It is absolutely apparent, however, that the thing which weighed most of all with those members of the British Cabinet who favored war was the same consideration of alleged British interests which had produced the bellicose stand of British in the second Morocco crisis and had also led to the Grey-Cambon correspondence of November, 1912. This means, however, that Great Britain was exactly as much bound in fact as though she had been bound by a treaty. The source-material on war-guilt which we now possess proves

that it would be rather difficult to imagine a probable situation in international relations where Russia and France could have been presented to England under more repellent circumstances or Austria and Germany under better auspices than in the crisis of 1914. Yet, Grey persisted unhesitatingly in his determination to cast England's lot with France and Russia, once it was evident that these Powers had decided to enter the conflict.

The whole key to British policy in 1914 is most admirably phrased by Crowe and Nicolson, the British under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs in 1914, in their comments of July 25, which were appended to Buchanan's communication to Grey on July 24. It will be remembered that this was very early in the crisis, being, in fact, before the Serbian reply to Austria had been delivered. Crowe's appraisal of the international situation at this time follows:

The moment has passed when it might have been possible to enlist French support in an effort to hold back Russia.

It is clear that France and Russia are decided to accept the challenge thrown out to them. Whether we may think of the merits of the Austrian charges against Serbia, France and Russia consider that these are the pretexts, and that the bigger cause of Triple Alliance versus Triple Entente is definitely engaged.

I think it would be impolitic, not to say dangerous, for England to attempt to controvert this opinion, or to endeavor to obscure the plain issue, by any representation at St. Petersburg and Paris.

The point that matters is whether Germany is or is not absolutely determined to have this war now.

There is still the chance that she can be induced to hesitate, if she can be made to apprehend that the war will find England by the side of France and Russia.

I can suggest only one effective way of bringing this home to the German Government without absolutely committing us definitely at this stage. If, the moment either Austria or Russia begin to mobilize, His Majesty's Government give orders to put our whole fleet on an immediate war footing this may conceivably make Germany realize the seriousness of the danger to which she would be exposed if England took part in the war.

It would be right, supposing this decision could be taken now, to inform the French and Russian Governments of it, and this again would be the best thing we could do to prevent a very grave situation arising as between England and Russia.

It is difficult not to agree with M. Sazonov that sooner or later England will be dragged into the war if it does come. We shall gain nothing by not making up our minds what we can do in circumstances that may arise tomorrow.

Should the war come, and England stand aside, one of two things must happen: (a) Either Germany and Austria win, crush France, and humiliate Russia. With the French fleet gone, Germany in occupation of the Channel, with the willing or unwilling cooperation of Holland and Belgium, what will be the position of a friendless England?

(b) Or France and Russia win. What would then be their attitude towards England? What about India and the Mediterranean?

Our interests are tied up with those of France and Russia in this struggle, which is not for the possession of Serbia, but one between Germany aiming at a political dictatorship in Europe and the Powers who desire to retain individual freedom. If we can help to avoid the conflict by showing our naval strength, ready to be instantly used, it would be wrong not to make the effort.

Whatever therefore our ultimate decision, I consider we should decide now to mobilize the fleet as soon as any other Great Power mobilizes, and that we should announce this decision without delay to the French and Russian Governments.

Nicolson added the observation that: "The points raised by Sir Eyre Crowe merit serious consideration, and doubtless the Cabinet will review the situation. Our attitude during the crisis will be regarded by Russia as a test and we must be careful not to alienate her." The policies outlined above were adhered to resolutely by the British Foreign Office throughout the crisis. This meant that England inevitably became a source of encouragement to Franco-Russian bellicosity and was equally irrevocably bound to enter the War. Her only hope of averting the European War lay in restraining Russia or in declaring her neutrality. Both of these she refused to do. Yet, we cannot say that Crowe and Nicolson wanted war for its own sake. On the 30th, Crowe appended to Document number 318 the following reflections with respect to the French and Russian appeals for a British declaration of unflinching solidarity with these Powers:

"What must weigh with His Majesty's Government is the consideration that they should not, by a declaration of unconditional solidarity with France and Russia induce and determine these two Powers to choose the path of war. If and when, however, it is certain that France and Russia cannot avoid war, and are going into it, my opinion, for what it is worth, is that in that

case our intervention should be immediate and decided."

At the same time that Crowe and Nicolson were endeavoring to influence Grey in the direction of a favorable attitude towards France and Russia, they were also working unceasingly to prejudice him against Germany by an almost incredibly malicious campaign devoted to maligning German acts and policies. Their distortions, in obvious defiance of facts known to both of them, are at times quite unbelievable, and make the Kaiser's digs at England in his marginal notes on the German Documents seem calm and penetrating analyses by comparison. (See *British Documents*, Nos. 149, 174, 185, 249, 264, 293.)

In his general attitude towards the problem of intervention on the side of France and Russia in the event of war, Grey stood shoulder to shoulder with Crowe and Nicolson. He was simply more cautious in the details and method of his procedure. He hesitated because he did not desire to incite France and Russia, because he hated to admit what he had frequently denied in the House of Commons, namely, the existence of secret British understandings with France, and, finally, because he feared an adverse vote in the Cabinet and the House of Commons if he were too hasty. Churchill is revealed in the documents as "rearing to go," and thoroughly with Crowe and Nicolson.

In addition to the considerations of international policy which led Grey to cast his lot with the Entente, it should not be forgotten that there were powerful forces in domestic British politics which strengthened the war party. The Conservatives, led by Bonar Law, felt that a war would delay, if not destroy, the constructive agrarian reforms and financial measures of Lloyd George, while the Ulsterites, under the leadership of Sir Edward Carson, saw in war a real hope of obstructing the introduction of the Irish Home Rule Act. The Northcliffe gang had the journalist's nose for war and its benefits.

As to the anti-war party in the British Cabinet, it has usually been believed that the leaders were John Morley and John Burns, who resigned in protest when it was apparent that England was going into the War. The writer learned in the summer of 1927, however, that, down to the time Morley and Burns resigned, one of the noisiest and most active members of the anti-war group was David Lloyd George. When it became evident that England was bound to enter the War, Lloyd George was faced with the alternative of shifting his position and continuing his brilliant career in politics or reverting to the brave stand as a protestant against folly which he had taken in the Boer War. This time, Lloyd George decided to be on the popular side, and justified his shift on the ground of the moral indignation developed in his bosom by the German invasion of Belgium.

If Germany had not invaded Belgium, but had merely defended herself against French invasion on the western front, it is possible that the English Cabinet would not have been able to enter war on the side of France and Russia; indeed, it is likely that if they had done so, popular opposition would have paralyzed their efforts. It is true that Sir Edward Grey offered several suggestions as to mediation, but his policy throughout the crisis was vacillating and weak. Having sown the wind between 1910 and 1914, he found it difficult to avoid reaping the whirlwind in 1914. His chief potential trump card which he might have played at the time would have been either an early warning of Germany that an aggressive campaign on her part in the west, and particularly an invasion of Belgium, would certainly bring about English intervention on the side of the Dual Alliance, or a warning to Russia that Russian mobilization would be followed by British neutrality. If he had issued such a warning to Germany in decisive terms around the 25th or 26th of July, it is probable that Germany would, even earlier than she did, have taken such steps as would have still further restrained Austria and made it more difficult for France and Russia to enlist the aid of England. There is, further, little doubt that he could have called Sazonov's bluff by a threat of neutrality.

But the most damaging indictment against Sir Edward Grey is that he did not put any effective pressure upon Russia or France in their aggressive action following Poincaré's visit to St. Petersburg. Indeed, he actually seems to have had a strong positive influence upon the final decision of the Russians to go ahead with the fatal general mobilization. In spite of the fact that Buchanan, the English ambassador at St. Petersburg, was urging caution on the Russians, Grey, as early as July 25, told Benckendorff, the Russian ambassador at London, that he believed that the nature of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia would make it necessary for Russia to mobilize against Austria. On the 27th he encouraged the Russians by telling them that they might regard the battle formation of the British fleet as proof of British intervention. This led Sazonov and the Russians to feel at this early date that they could surely count on Eng-

lish as well as French support in their projected military measures which they knew would inevitably bring on a European war.

No fair-minded historian can well doubt that Sir Edward Grey had earnestly worked for some pacific adjustment of European difficulties in the period following 1908, or that he was probably among the best intentioned of the foreign secretaries in Europe in 1914. At the same time, no one who has consulted the works of Morley, Loreburn, Morley, Henderson, Montagu, Ewart and Lutz can well maintain that he behaved as a sincere, devoted and astute champion of peace in the crisis of the early summer of 1914. He must now be included as second only to the French, Russian and Austrian statesmen in degree of actual and immediate responsibility for the world conflict.

It must also, of course, be recognized that, in spite of his long service in the Foreign Office, Grey was a somewhat weak and vacillating character, rather ignorant of the details of foreign policy and diplomatic problems. Like Berchtold, he was wont to rely for advice upon his under-secretaries. Of these, Sir Arthur Nicolson, former ambassador at St. Petersburg, a favorite of the Tsar, and a traditional diplomat and militarist, was the most important. Grey admitted that he had been made Under-Secretary of State in 1910 in order to strengthen the ties between England and Russia. There is little doubt that Grey was as much influenced by Nicolson and Crowe in his decisions of July 1914, as was Berchtold by Forgach, Musil and others. The British documents show that Sir Eyre Crowe, second under-secretary of state, was perhaps more bellicose than Nicolson.

The delicate and embarrassing situation in which the imminence of war placed the British Cabinet, some of the most eminent members of which resigned rather than participate in any declaration of war, was suddenly removed by what was for Asquith and Grey the heaven-sent episode of the German invasion of Belgium. It is highly probable that the rump British Cabinet would have tried to force the country into war irrespective of the invasion of Belgium, but the actual invasion saved them from a crisis by arousing British indignation, and it put the country rather solidly behind the Entente. It should be pointed out, however, that there was no particular ground for ultra-sensitiveness in the British conscience with respect to the German invasion of Belgium. On two earlier occasions, namely, in 1870 and 1887, the British government and British opinion had repudiated any idea of the definite obligation of Great Britain to protect the existing neutrality of Belgium. England had also, in the decade before the War, made repeated, if futile, efforts to secure Belgian consent to the landing of British troops on Belgian soil in the event of war between the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance.

The complete British documents expose with great thoroughness Grey's exploitation of the Belgian subterfuge. We have already made it clear that Grey, Crowe and Nicolson had formulated their general attitude towards the nature of British policy in the crisis by July 25, and in none of their arguments for British intervention did any consideration enter for either Serbia or Belgium. The slogan of protection for "poor, innocent little nations" emerged only after the decision to intervene had been reached and a high moral issue was deemed essential to attract the support of British opinion. Before Grey addressed his famous question to France and Germany on the 31st, as to what their stand would be on the issue of Belgian neutrality, he knew from Goschen's conversations with Bethmann-Hollweg that Germany's attitude would be. Even more significant, Bourgeois and Pages have proved from unpublished French material that, on July 31, before he had received a reply from either France or Germany, Grey told Cambon that he was personally convinced that England should intervene immediately. He did not dare to give any definite promise, however, as he feared an adverse vote in the Cabinet and the House of Commons unless he could hold over their heads the prospect of a German violation of the neutrality of Belgium. It was well known long ago that England was not bound by the Treaty of 1839 to protect Belgian neutrality, that Grey coldly rejected the German proposal to respect Belgian neutrality, in the event of a promise of British neutrality, and that Grey teased out of Belgium her appeal to the Entente for armed protection. No one has better stated the essential facts in regard to Great Britain and the Belgian issue than the brilliant French writer, Alfred Fabre-Luce:

"It had been a welcome turn of fortune which came to the rescue of a menaced Government, the medium they employed to show the people the use of a war their leaders considered necessary. It seemed a sufficient reason for an act already decided upon for less good reasons; it assured a political and economic antagonism being reduced to a moral proposition, and thus involved spiritual forces in the war." It should further be emphasized

that the conduct of Great Britain during the World War was scarcely in line with what would naturally have been expected of a country which entered the conflict primarily to satisfy the cause of neutral rights, international law and international obligations. She bulldozed Greece into the War by methods comparable to those used by Germany in Belgium, and her procedure with respect to the international law of blockade, contraband and continuous voyage was such as to constitute a most flagrant violation of international law in these fields. The British assaults upon neutral rights during the War are among the darkest of the blots upon the Allied conduct during this period.

VIII. ITALY AND BELGIUM

Italy, along with Belgium, may be freed of any responsibility whatsoever for the outbreak of the War. Italy, after the War had actually started, quite naturally and properly considered which group of combatants seemed likely to offer the most favorable opportunities and results from aid and intervention, and joined the Entente because she felt she had the most to gain thereby. Nevertheless, in the crisis of July, 1914, she was distinctly favorable to peace and, as Morhardt has shown, offered the most attractive and feasible plan of mediation and arbitration of the Serbian issue set forth by any great European Power. It has frequently been charged that, whatever the other facts in the circumstances connected with the outbreak of the World War in 1914, certainly Germany and Austria were the most stubborn and determined in rejecting arbitration and mediation. This is no more true than the other phases of the earlier opinion of war responsibility. It is true that, up to July 31, Austria rejected all schemes for arbitration which looked to an intervention of other Powers in her treatment of Serbia, but it is equally true that the Russians were as determined and precipitate in regard to their mobilization in defense of Serbia. And if Germany declined to accept one of Sir Edward Grey's earlier plans for an arbitration of the Serbian controversy which was disapproved by her ally, Austria, an equally damaging indictment can be made of the Entente for its refusal to consider seriously the very attractive Italian plan for a satisfactory arbitration of the Balkan dispute. And in this rejection of the Italian proposal no one was more prominent than Sir Edward Grey. Germany rejected only one of Grey's peace plans, and for this she suggested what Grey himself admitted at the time to be a better substitute.

IX. CONCLUSION

As a concise summary of the status of scholarly opinion as to war responsibility perhaps nothing is better than the following quotation from G. Lowes Dickinson's masterly *International Anarchy*:

Little Serbia stood on the verge of satisfying her national ambitions at the cost of the peoples and civilizations of three continents. For years the little state of Serbia had been under the mining of the Austrian Empire. . . . What was the Empire to do in self-defense? One can conceive a world in which Austria would not have wished to hold down a nationality against its will. But that would not be the world of history, past or present. Never has an empire resigned before the disruptive forces of nationality. Always it has fought. And I do not believe that there was a state in existence that would not, under similar circumstances, have determined, as Austria did, to finish the menace, once for all, by war. . . . With every year that passed the Austrian position would get worse and the Serbian better. So at least the Austrians thought, and not without reason. They took their risk according to the usual canons in such matters. They may be accused of miscalculation, but I do not see that they can be accused of wrong by anyone who accepts now, or who accepted then, the principles which have always dictated the policy of states. . . . German diplomacy was cumbersome, stupid and dishonest. Granted it was! But German policy was such as any state would have adopted in her position. The Powers of the Entente say that the offense was Germany's backing of Austria, Germans say that the offense was Russia's backing of Serbia. On that point, really, the whole controversy turns. To my mind the German position is the more reasonable.

The pertinent question is why was the War not localized, as Austria and Germany intended and desired? There is only one answer to this: Because Russia did not choose to allow it. Why not? The answer is that she wanted Constantinople and the Straits; that she wanted access to the Mediterranean; that she wanted extension of territory and influence; that she had a "historic mission"; that she must make herself secure, in short, the whole farrago of superstitions that dominate all states under the conditions of the armed anarchy. . . . France entered for the sake of the balance of power and to recover Alsace-Lorraine; and her technical success in waiting till the declaration of war came from Germany does not alter the position. It had been known for at least two years past, it was reaffirmed more than once during the crisis, that if Germany came in against Russia, France would come in against Germany. At any rate, since 1912, France would have entered when Russia did. And does anyone who

has perused the previous chapters, and who realizes the state of Europe, believe that Russia would not have started the war a year or two later? . . . And England? . . . She had military and naval commitments to France which were like a suction-pipe to draw her, whether she would or not, into the war. And that approximation to the other two Powers of the Entente was made for no other reason than the maintenance of the balance of power. We had become more afraid of Germany than of our traditional enemies, France and Russia. After all of our commitments to France it would have been base to desert her. Agreed! But what were the objects for which those commitments were made? Our own power, our own empire, our own security.

In the article in *Current History*, May 1924, the author made an effort to arrange the European powers in a numerical order of responsibility. This is, perhaps, valid procedure, but it is probably better simply to let the matter rest by saying that Serbia, Russia and France were the only states in 1914 that desired a European war and worked to secure it. Austria insisted upon a local punitive war, but ardently hoped that this might be kept from growing into a general conflict. Germany, England and Italy were opposed to any kind of a war after July 26, but were too short-sighted, stupid, selfish or dilatory to be able to avert the calamity.

Another way of stating responsibility for the World War is to separate and analyze the moral and military responsibility. The moral issue is as to whether Austria had a better case than Serbia in 1914 and as to whether Germany was more warranted in backing Austria than was Russia in backing Serbia. In the light of the facts which we now possess, there can be no doubt about this problem. Austria obviously fought in self-defense, while Russia, who had betrayed her Serbian kinsmen in 1908 and in the Turkish negotiations of 1911, precipitated the European war for purposes of diplomatic prestige and territorial aggrandizement. In regard to the military responsibility, likewise, the facts are equally clear. The Russian general mobilization meant inevitable war and it came long before the general mobilization of any other Power. It was also indefensibly premature, as the Russians knew that Austria could take no effective military measures against Serbia within at least two weeks after Russia actually mobilized.

In arriving at a clear understanding about the outbreak of the World War it is also necessary to dismiss the thesis of certain writers that the War was the inevitable outcome of the European system of international anarchy, and conflicting alliances. No one could possibly be more willing than the present writer to concede the fact that a dangerous and menacing situation was created by the European system of 1914, but this system had existed for forty years without any major war. It was unquestionably the specific personalities and policies of 1914 which produced the great cataclysm. This can be proved very definitely simply by reflecting as to what would have been the outcome of the crisis after the murder of the Archduke if Tisza had been in control of Austrian policy, Caillaux in charge of matters in France, Kokovizov, Foreign Minister of Russia in the place of Sazonov, and Lord Morley or Earl Loreburn in the shoes of Sir Edward Grey. Under such circumstances it is highly probable that there would have been no war had there been merely an interchange of one man, namely, if Caillaux had been presiding over the destinies of France instead of the doughty Lorrainer, Raymond Poincaré.

Another illusion in regard to war responsibility which it is necessary to combat is the view that Revisionism constitutes an extreme emotional swing of the pendulum away from the war-time fictions, and that ultimately the truth will be found to lie somewhere between the views expressed in William Stearns Davis' *Roots of the War* and those expounded in the present chapter. This is certainly a benign attitude and, a priori, seems sensible. The fact is, however, that we were so blinded by war-time propaganda as to the black devilishness of the Central Powers and the lamb-like innocence of the Entente that we are still unprepared for the extent of the exposure of Serbia, France and Russia which the documents have produced. Almost without exception, all the new material of the last three years has served to bolster up an even more advanced version of Revisionism, and there is no probability that any important extenuating material will be published hereafter which will aid the cause of the Entente. If such material existed it would have seen light before this. On the other hand, we still have a trump card to be played against the Entente, namely, the French Documents and the secret Russian correspondence with Serbia. Therefore, instead of settling back into any such weak-kneed position as that taken by Professor Bernadotte Schmitt in *Foreign Affairs* for October, 1926, we can be sure that Revisionism will not have to retreat a step, but will continue to leave the more conservative historians breathless for a long time to come.

X. HOW THE UNITED STATES BECAME INVOLVED IN THE INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY

The reasons for the entry of the United States into the World War are many and complex. About the only thing which may be stated clearly and dogmatically is that the resumption of German submarine warfare in 1917 was the occasion and not the reason for our becoming a belligerent.

In the first place, due partly to industrial and commercial rivalry and partly to the pro-British sources of most of our news concerning Germany in the decade prior to 1914, the United States had grown progressively more cool towards Germany. Not only did most American newspapers get much of their news concerning Germany indirectly through the Northcliffe press in England, but they also frequently employed jointly the same representatives in Germany. Particularly notorious here was the influence of Frederick William Wile, German correspondent for both the Northcliffe press in England and leading American papers like the New York Times and the Chicago Tribune. Wile did his best to poison American opinion in regard to Germany, and he greatly exaggerated the Zabern Incident of 1913 which was particularly exploited in Anti-German newspaper circles. This tendency was helped on after the outbreak of the War through the German invasion of Belgium and the exploitation of this act by the Entente propagandists. Therefore, before our material interests were vitally at stake, we were inclined to sympathize with the Allies, though popular sentiment was divided throughout the country.

It was not long, however, before important American interests were

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Of The American Freeman published weekly at Girard, Kansas, for October 1, 1929.

1. Name of publication: The American Freeman.
2. Issue date: October 1, 1929.
3. Issue for this month: October 1, 1929.
4. Issue for last month: September 1, 1929.
5. Issue for previous month: August 1, 1929.
6. Name and address of publisher: E. Haldeeman-Julius, publisher, E. Haldeeman-Julius, editor, E. Haldeeman-Julius, business manager, E. Haldeeman-Julius, Girard, Kansas.
7. Name and address of owner: E. Haldeeman-Julius, publisher, E. Haldeeman-Julius, editor, E. Haldeeman-Julius, business manager, E. Haldeeman-Julius, Girard, Kansas.
8. Name and address of proprietor: E. Haldeeman-Julius, publisher, E. Haldeeman-Julius, editor, E. Haldeeman-Julius, business manager, E. Haldeeman-Julius, Girard, Kansas.
9. Name and address of stockholder: E. Haldeeman-Julius, publisher, E. Haldeeman-Julius, editor, E. Haldeeman-Julius, business manager, E. Haldeeman-Julius, Girard, Kansas.
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involved. The Entente borrowed enormous sums from the American bankers and began at once to place great orders in the United States for war materials. Germany raised most of her funds by domestic loans and by taxation, and American banking houses also frowned on loans to Germany. Likewise, the British command of the seas and the illegal interference of Britain with neutral trade, prevented Germany from purchasing war materials from the United States, had she wished to do so. Therefore, our material interests were almost exclusively on the side of the Entente. We were not long in responding to the dictates of those interests. In September, 1914, former-Ambassador Myron T. Herrick, Ambassador William Graves Sharp and Robert Bacon, all closely connected with great American banking houses, told the famous French publicist, Gabriel Hanotaux, that France should keep up courage. Though there was as yet little pro-war sentiment in America, they promised Hanotaux that in due time this country would be brought in on the side of France. Writing in the *Anglo-American* number of the *Manchester Guardian*, on January 27, 1920, Mr. Thomas W. Lamont of J. P. Morgan and Company, set forth the facts about the attitude of his firm with great candor:

"At the request of certain of the foreign Governments the firm of Messrs. J. P. Morgan and Company undertook to coordinate the requirements of the Allies, and then to bring about regularity and promptness in fulfilling those requirements. Those were the days when American citizens were being urged to remain neutral in action, in word, and even in thought. But our firm had never for one moment been neutral; we didn't know how to be. From the very start we did everything we could to contribute to the cause of the Allies. And this particular work had two effects: one in assisting the Allies in the production of goods and munitions in America necessary to the Allies' vigorous prosecution of the war; the other in helping to develop this great and profitable export trade that our country has had."

It need not be assumed that the attitude of the other large banking houses was notably different from that of the greatest. It is not necessary to accept a naive theory of economic determinism in order to realize that the American press responds very quickly and decisively to the trend of business opinion in the country. Hence, the American papers quickly took up the Entente cause with enthusiasm, though there were a few exceptions, chiefly the lesser papers in Germanic sections of the country. Further, a war is an excellent thing for newspapers, which fact gave the press a special interest in favoring intervention. Of the two, however, the business pressure was far the most powerful in swinging the newspapers for war. The American interests were ably aided by British propagandists in lining up the American press and in educating American opinion. Sir Gilbert Parker, chief of the British propaganda service in the United States, thus describes in *Harper's Magazine* for March, 1918, how England set us straight as to war issues:

Perhaps here I may be permitted to say a few words concerning my own work since the beginning of the war. It is in a way a story by itself, but I feel justified in writing one or two paragraphs about it. Practically since the day war broke out between England and the Central Powers I became responsible for American publicity. I need hardly say that the scope of my department was very extensive and its activities widely ranged. Among the activities was a weekly report to the British Cabinet on the state of American opinion, and constant touch with the permanent correspondents of American newspapers in England. I also frequently arranged for important public men in England to act for us by interviews in American newspapers; and among these distinguished people were Mr. Lloyd George (the present Prime Minister), Viscount Grey, Mr. Balfour, Mr. Bonar Law, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Sir Edward Carson, Lord Robert Cecil, Mr. Walter Runciman (the Lord Chancellor), Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Lord Cromer, Will Crooks, Lord Curzon, Lord Gladstone, Lord Haldane, Mr. Henry James, Mr. John Redmond, Mr. Selfridge, Mr. Zangwill, Mrs. Humphry Ward, and fully a hundred others.

Among other things, we supplied three hundred and sixty newspapers, in the smaller States of the United States with an English newspaper, which gives a weekly review and comment of the affairs of the war. We established connection with the man in the street through cinema pictures of the Army and Navy, as well as through interviews, articles, pamphlets, etc.; and by letters in reply to individual American critics, which were printed in the chief newspaper of the State in which they lived, and were copied in newspapers of other and neighboring States. We advised and stimulated many people to write articles; we utilized the friendly services and assistance of confidential friends; we had reports from important Americans constantly, and established association, by personal correspondence, with influential and eminent people of every profession in the United States, beginning with university and college presidents, professors and scientific men, and running through all the ranges of the population. We asked our friends and corre-

spondents to arrange for speeches, debates, and lectures by American citizens, but we did not encourage Britishers to go to America and preach the doctrine of entrance into the war. Besides an immense private correspondence with individuals, we had our documents and literature sent to great numbers of public libraries, Y. M. C. A. societies, universities, colleges, historical societies, clubs, and newspapers.

It is hardly necessary to say that the work was one of extreme difficulty and delicacy, but I was fortunate in having a wide acquaintance in the United States and in knowing that a great many people had read my books and were not prejudiced against me. Also, it should be remembered that the Society of Pilgrims, whose work of international unity cannot be overestimated, has played a part in promoting understanding between the two peoples, and the establishment of the American Officers' Club in Lord Leconfield's house in London with H. R. H. the Duke of Connaught as president, has done, and is doing, immense good. It should also be remembered that it was the Pilgrims' Society under the fine chairmanship of Mr. Harry Britton, which took charge of the Hon. James Beck when he visited England in 1916, and gave him so good a chance to do great work for the cause of unity between the two nations. I am glad and proud to think that I had something to do with these arrangements which resulted in the Pilgrims taking Mr. Beck into their charge.

Next to the contention that Germany wilfully launched the World War, the leading myth exploited by Entente propaganda to deceive the United States and induce us to enter the War was the assertion that Germany introduced into her conduct of war the most frightful and savage practices. These were explained by some as being due to the fact that the German race was utterly uncivilized; indeed, was quite incapable of being civilized. Such atrocious conduct was deemed but natural for a nation of "Huns." Others, while not objecting to the thesis of German savagery, held that the German practices were the result of a sinister and studied German program. The Germans had decided to wage a war of frightfulness in order to terrify the enemy and break their morale through the fear of resistance. Among the forms of atrocious conduct with which the Germans were charged, we may mention the crucifixion of French and Belgian soldiers, cutting the hands off numerous Belgian children, the rape of innumerable Belgian women and girls, cutting the breasts off Belgian and Polish women, robbing not only private homes but churches and hospitals, and sinking great numbers of gallant Allied sailors, taking particular delight in picking off those struggling helplessly in the water.

Great Britain was most systematic and efficient in inventing and publishing these tales and she made a great stroke in getting James Bryce to affix his signature to a singularly complete and varied collection of stories of German savagery and rapacity in Belgium. This so-called "Bryce Report" was released in the United States shortly after the sinking of the *Lusitania*, and had a great effect in estranging American opinion from Germany on account of the confidence which the American citizens reposed in Mr. Bryce. The Atrocities Myth was the chief instrument utilized by the British propagandists and the American financial interests in "educating" American opinion up to the point where we were willing to enter the War.

Once any effort was made to investigate the foundations for these lurid tales, they were at once shown to be fantastic. Of course, war is not a pleasant and esthetic form of recreation and many things happened during its progress which the participants on both sides would be only too glad to forget. At the same time, it can no longer be maintained that the conduct of German soldiers in regard to war methods was a whit worse than that of other combatants, not excluding the soldiers of the United States. Premiers Lloyd George of England and Nitti of Italy authorized an investigation of all cases of alleged atrocities conducted against Belgian civilians which were mentioned with sufficient exactness to allow an investigation to be started. Their investigators were unable to uncover a single case of wilful mutilation, whereas the Bryce Report and similar documents alleged that they existed by the thousand. In the summer of 1927 the German government proposed that the whole question of alleged German "snipers" and German retaliation be investigated and reported upon by an impartial committee. The Belgian government refused the suggestion, and it was strongly supported by the Belgian and the French papers. They feared lest this might cause a complete overhauling of the whole atrocities situation.

Frenchmen interested in the truth have told how, in the French propaganda headquarters, leading French artists manufactured casts of such exhibits as mutilated French and Belgian children which were then photographed and scattered broadcast. Ferdinand Avenarius, in an illuminating and amazing brochure, entitled *How the War Madness Was Engineered*, has shown how the Entente obtained many of the alleged

authentic pictures of atrocities. Pictures of German officers, with trophies awarded before the World War broke out, were represented as German soldiers gloating over spoil taken from churches and homes. The pictures of the horrible Russian programs against the Jews in Poland in 1905 and later years were displayed as literal pictorial records of the German conduct in Poland in 1914-15. General Charrier has recently revealed how he created the myth of the German corpse-factory by exchanging the captions on two pictures—one of a train-load of German soldiers being taken back for burial and the other of a load of dead horses destined for soap and fertilizer plants. He told further of faking a diary to be put in the pocket of a dead German, recounting how this German had been working in such a corpse-factory before coming to the front to be shot. As to the submarine warfare and submarine atrocities, even Admiral Sims admitted that there was but one case of a submarine atrocity on record attributable to German sailors and that in this case the responsible officers were promptly and severely punished. In other words, the whole framework of the contention that the Germans were only a collection of super-gorillas, devoid of human traits, has collapsed no less completely than such war-guilt fictions as the Potsdam Conference. A friend of the writer approached James Bryce about the Bryce Report some time before Mr. Bryce's death, but Bryce refused to attempt any defense beyond the cynical assertion that one must expect almost anything in war-time. Arthur Ponsonby, the able British statesman and publicist, has recently compensated for the Bryce Report by publishing a remarkable exposure of Entente propaganda, in a comprehensive anthology, entitled *Falsehood in Wartime*.

The insincerity of the Entente horror concerning alleged German conduct during the War is well exhibited by the behavior of the French and British since 1918. In Morocco the French bombarded non-combatants frequently from airplanes. In Syria the same thing was repeated; and for trivial reasons, compared with the excuse for the German invasion of Belgium, the French reduced to ruins the city of Damascus, a city infinitely more precious in the history of art and tradition than Rheims, Amiens, Louvain or any of the cities which the Germans were so severely criticized for shelling. Finally, the conduct of the French, in relation to the behavior of the French Negro troops towards German women in the occupied Rhine towns, was far more deplorable than anything which can be proved of the Germans during war-time. In fact, the well demonstrated actualities concerning the "black terror" on the Rhine are nearly as bad as any of the stories of German rapine in Belgium during the War. By far the greatest and most indefensible atrocity which took place after 1914 was the British blockade of Germany for nearly a year after the Armistice, which resulted in the unnecessary starvation of some 800,000 German women and children. This is, perhaps, the most staggering example of human brutality in modern times. In the face of this, one need hardly mention the notorious Amritsar massacre in India in 1919.

The British campaign in converting American opinion to the Entente viewpoint was so rapidly and completely successful that it amazed even Lord Northcliffe. While on a trip to the United States he remarked to a prominent Columbia University professor that only the Chinese equaled the Americans in their gullibility in accepting the Entente version of the causes and issues of the World War.

There is little probability that President Wilson was in any way consciously influenced by America's material interests in the struggle. Down to 1917 he had refused to allow any member of the firm of J. P. Morgan and Company to enter the White House. Mr. Wilson was, however, very pro-British in his cultural sympathies. As Hale and others have shown, he admired British culture and statesmen beyond all others. His great heroes were men like Milton, Burke and Adam Smith. He knew little of Continental literature, statesmen or politics, in spite of the fact that he had once written a college text-book on formal aspects of European government. He really felt that Great Britain and her Allies were fighting for civilization against the brutal tactics of the Germans, and that civilization was actually hanging in the balance. He did not desire to have the United States enter the War if England seemed likely to win without our aid, but as soon as this appeared doubtful, he was convinced that we should enter as early as he could persuade Congress and the country to follow him. Wilson's own pro-British proclivities were greatly strengthened by the influence of those two vigorous Anglo-manics, Ambassador Page and Secretary Houston. Mr. Wilson's attitude on this point was well summarized by Wilson's Attorney General, T. W. Gregory, in a letter to the *New York Times* for January 29, 1925, telling of Wilson's response to Cabinet criticism of Great Britain's violations of our rights as neutrals: "After patiently

listening, Mr. Wilson said, in that quiet way of his, that the ordinary rules of conduct had no application to the situation; that the Allies were standing with their backs to the wall, fighting wild beasts; that he would permit nothing to be done by our country to hinder or embarrass them in the prosecution of the war unless admitted rights were grossly violated, and that this policy must be understood as settled." Thus did Mr. Wilson live up to his stated ideal that every true American must be neutral in thought as well as in deed!

Later, Mr. Wilson added to his pro-British reasons for desiring to enter the War the conception that unless he was at the Peace Conference he could not act decisively in bringing about a peace of justice and permanence. Shortly before we entered the War in April, 1917, Mr. Wilson confessed this motive to Miss Jane Addams in a conference with her at the White House, which she thus describes in her *Peace and Bread in Time of War*:

"The President's mood was stern and far from the scholar's detachment as he told us of recent disclosures of German machinations in Mexico and announced the impossibility of any form of adjudication. He still spoke to us, however, as to fellow pacifists to whom he was forced to confess that war had become inevitable. He used one phrase which I had heard Colonel House use so recently that it still stuck firmly in my memory. The phrase was to the effect that, as head of a nation participating in the war, the President of the United States would have a seat at the Peace Table, but that if he remained the representative of a neutral country he could at best only 'call through a crack in the door.' The appeal he made was, in substance, that the foreign policies which we so extravagantly admired could have a chance if he were there to push and to defend them, but not otherwise. It was as if his heart's desire spoke through his words and dictated his view of the situation. But I found my mind challenging his whole theory of leadership."

The relation of the interests to Mr. Wilson's work in bringing the United States into the War was an indirect one. They had brought the papers around to the Entente position, and Wilson was unquestionably to some extent affected by the newspapers and the Entente propaganda in his gradual conversation to the conviction that the Germans were "wild beasts." Then, when he had decided that we should go into the war, he had an eager and subservient press at his beck and call. Always an intensely vain man, he also realized by 1917 that popularity with the press lay on the side of intervention.

It is of little importance to examine the actual legal issues at stake in our entry into the War, as they had slight influence on our decisions. England continually and most extensively violated the long established rights of neutrals with respect to blockade, continuous voyage and contraband, as well as inflicting innumerable minor humiliations on neutral traders and using the American flag freely for her vessels. Germany retaliated by submarine warfare, and in this way placed in jeopardy American lives and property. England violated our rights infinitely more extensively than Germany, but less dramatically, especially in that the German procedure threatened American lives. Germany, however, offered to accept Mr. Bryan's proposal that England should obey international law on the seas and that Germany should give up her submarine warfare. England, knowing her Page and Wilson, refused even to discuss such a proposition. In other words, as Mr. Wilson himself admitted, we had two sets of international law, one for Germany and one for Great Britain. Mr. Bryan was too honest to go on in this way, and resigned as Secretary of State.

Many would cite the *Lusitania* case as an example of British rectitude and German depravity and lawlessness, but such an attitude betokens an ignorance of the facts in the case. The Germans made a great tactical blunder in sinking the *Lusitania* but the legal right was all on their side. The *Lusitania* had been armed by Britain before the War, it was in 1915 registered as an auxiliary cruiser in the British navy, it was carrying a heavy cargo of ammunition and other munitions of war, and prospective American passengers had been amply warned by the German government and Mr. Bryan. Therefore, the *Lusitania* lost her status as a merchant vessel and could be legally sunk without warning. Civilians embarked on her at their own risk, and Americans taking passage on the *Lusitania* were, in addition, conniving at the violation of the laws of their own country by accepting passage upon a vessel carrying explosives. Yet, because the Germans sank this ship, Mr. Roosevelt, who, less than a year before had defended the German invasion of Belgium, would have had this country leap into the War on the side of Great Britain.

Finally, it remains to be shown that the United States did not enter the War because of the resumption of submarine warfare by Germany. Mr. Wilson and Colonel House de-

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Continued from page three]

cided by December, 1915, that the time had come when England needed our active assistance. Hence, Wilson sent House abroad in January, 1916, with a peace plan which embodied German admission of defeat and appropriate penalties. If Germany would not accept this, then the United States would, if House and Wilson were successful, enter the war on the side of the Allies. The Entente, however, refused to accept Wilson's plan, because it proposed a far more lenient treatment of Germany than the Entente had embodied in the Secret Treaties. Therefore, Colonel House had to wend his way sorrowfully homeward.

Mr. Wilson played his next card at home. One morning early in April, 1916, Mr. Wilson called in conference the Democratic leaders of Congress, Champ Clark, Hal Flood and Claude Kitchin, told them that he felt it was time the United States entered the war, and asked for their support in leading Congress to accept his plan. These men were opposed to war and, hence, rejected his proposals somewhat heatedly. Wilson knew that it was a poor time to split the party just before an election, so he dropped the matter at once and, with Colonel House, mapped out a pacifist platform for the coming campaign. Governor Martin Glynn of New York and Senator Ollie James of Kentucky were sent to the St. Louis convention to make keynote speeches, which were based on the slogan: "He kept us out of war!" Senator James' pacifist speech stamped the convention and he was requested to repeat it. The campaign was fought out on this basis and Mr. Wilson was re-elected by a narrow margin.

Sure of four more years in the White House, Mr. Wilson no longer had to worry about pacifist Democrats, as he could count on the support of bellicose Republicans in his war policies. Before he had been inaugurated a second time, the Germans played directly into his hands by announcing the resumption of submarine warfare. They thus furnished Wilson with as admirable an occasion for putting the United States into the conflict as that with which they had presented Grey through their invasion of Belgium. It was fortunate for Britain and the bankers that the Germans made this timely blunder, as Great Britain had overdrawn her American credit by some \$450,000,000 and the bankers were having trouble in floating more large private loans. It was necessary now to pass on the burden of financing the Entente to the Federal Treasury. We thus entered the struggle, along with the armies of the Tsar of Russia, the Mikado of Japan, and the King of Italy, to make the world safe for democracy and to bring about a peace based upon right, justice and generosity.

We have conventionally believed that our entry into the war was a great boon to civilization and that it saved the world from German domination and the imposition of German militarism and tyranny upon the planet as a whole. The facts are almost exactly the reverse of this picture. In 1916 and 1917 Germany was ready for peace on very moderate and constructive terms, certainly terms far more fair and more to the advantage of the world at large than those imposed at Versailles two years later. In fact, if the American papers had been able or willing to get hold of and print the full German terms of peace and to portray accurately the state of the German mind in 1916 and 1917, there is little probability that Mr. Wilson or anyone else could have forced the United States into the World War. There is little probability that Germany could have conquered the Allies even though the United States had not intervened in their behalf. The best that even Ludendorff hoped for after 1916 was enough success to force an honorable peace. Germany would have welcomed an honorable peace; it was the Allies who were bent upon the destruction of Germany even after they knew that a just peace could be secured by negotiation.

What the American entry did was to encourage the Allies in the wastes and savagery of the "knock-out" victory which led to Versailles, the blockade of Germany after the Armistice, and the outrages in the Ruhr. The highly precarious foundation upon which Europe stands today, with almost a sure guaranty of future war, as well as the spread of Bolshevism, which was due to the prolongation of the war after the Russian people desired to withdraw, may both be traced to the results of American intervention. Our entry was, thus, a menace to both the "Reds" who met punishment as a result of the Palmer investigation, and the conservatives who have been thrown into a panic by Bolshevism.

There are some observers, especially German radicals and non-German sentimentalists who contend that the American entry into the World War was vindicated, if for no other reason, because it hastened democracy and republicanism in Germany. Now the writer is well known as a person of liberal political outlook and a believer in the principles of political freedom, but he can scarcely believe that the difference between a constitutional monarchy and a republic in Germany is worth the price which was paid in the continuation of the war, in the crushing humiliation of Germany, in

the deprivation of Germany of valuable territory, in the loss of the German colonies, in the horrors of the blockade after the Armistice, which cost Germany nearly a million lives among non-combatants, to mention but a few of the more disastrous results for Germany of American entry into the war. It may further be doubted whether the German Republic was worth the international anarchy which has been continued in Europe as a result of the Entente victory and the dictated atrocity of Versailles. If America had not entered the war we should, in all probability, have secured a decent negotiated peace, the "Balkanization" of Europe would have been prevented, and good feeling would have been restored much more rapidly between the formerly warring peoples. The German monarchy would have been compelled to grant reforms which would have made it similar to the purely formal regal ornamentation in England. While not an apologist for Hohenzollern omniscience, the writer would hold that the Hohenzollern dynasty was better fitted by tradition and achievement to serve as an ornamental symbol of German unity and progress than the Hanoverian dynasty which graces the British throne and causes democrats abroad no grave concern. After 1918 it was no longer a choice in Germany between tyranny and radical democracy.

One of the main activities of the Allied censorship and propaganda in this period consisted in keeping from the United States any adequate knowledge of the very real desire for peace in Germany at this time and the highly reasonable and statesmanlike nature of the German proposals. These really sincere efforts of the Germans were portrayed as but insidious German propaganda designed to divide the Allied Powers. The chief reason why the Entente statesmen did not accept these German terms and end the war, with all its attendant miseries and losses, two years before the armistice, was their knowledge of the apparent breaking down of American neutrality and their ever brightening hope that the United States would ultimately come into the conflict on their side. Mr. Page's support of the British cause practically destroyed in England all fear of American protests against the Entente violations of neutral rights and made England quite unwilling to consider any peace proposals at the close of 1916. Had the British believed that the United States meant its protests seriously they would most certainly have listened with some patience to the peace proposals, but Page gave assurance that we were really their ally and that they had nothing to fear from us. Had Mr. Wilson dismissed Mr. Page early in the war and replaced him by an honest, courageous, far-sighted and well-informed Ambassador, and preserved a strict neutrality on the part of this country, there seems little doubt that the war would have come to an end by December, 1916, and would have been settled by a treaty of peace infinitely superior in every way to that which was worked out in 1919-20 and imposed by the victors at Versailles.

Page and Wilson must in part bear the responsibility, not merely for the expense, losses and miseries brought to the United States by the World War but also for the destruction in Europe following 1916, both in war and in the arrogant and atrocious policies of France and England, particularly the former, since the Armistice and the Peace Treaty. Already, as Mr. Gregory complains, England has begun to forget or minimize our contributions to winning the war, while the hatred of the United States in France exceeds anything which has existed since the French denunciation of the United States during the Spanish-American War. The absurd and baseless contention that the Allies really saved the lives of countless millions of Americans, as well as preserving our national independence and preventing us from becoming a slavish dependency of Potsdam, has been made the foundation for a serious proposal that we should cancel the Allied indebtedness to the United States. Such mythology is on a par with the "corpse-factory" fabrications of the war period itself. There may be valid grounds for debt cancellation, but this alleged justification is one of the most ironically amusing propositions in the history of humanity.

Added to the material and financial expenditures of the United States, due to our participation in the World War, are the political corruption and incompetence which it has generated, the raids upon American liberty by Palmer and his associates and successors, and the general decline of morale in American public and private life which has been unparalleled by any earlier developments in the history of our country. In this connection we should not fail to remember the notorious debauching of American traditions with respect to enemy-owned property by the Alien Property Custodian which involved the most dangerous legal jockeying and subterfuge and set a very menacing precedent for some future war when the United States might be the loser by such procedure.

If we honestly face the facts we shall probably have to agree that the entry of the United States into the World War was an almost un-

mitigated disaster, not only to us but to Europe. We shall ultimately understand that Woodrow Wilson's greatest message to the world was not his war propaganda or his disregarded Fourteen Points, but his much ridiculed proclamation that the only possible peace was a "peace without victory."

The degree to which Mr. Wilson was compelled to develop psychic blindness, amnesia and anesthesia in order to "stomach" Entente idealism towards the end of the war is well brought out by his refusal to recognize the existence of the Secret Treaties until concretely faced by them at the Paris Peace Conference. Though they were published in the winter of 1917-18 in the New York *Evening Post* and elsewhere, though the editor of that paper personally put them in the hands of Secretary Tumulty with the promise of the latter that he would call them to the attention of Mr. Wilson, and though Walter Lippmann contends that he is personally certain that Mr. Wilson actually knew of their existence and nature soon after they were published, yet when the latter left for Paris at the close of November, 1918, he professed to be in complete ignorance of these documents which Mr. Balfour had been careful not to disclose when on his mission to this country in June, 1917.

Perhaps the best epitaph on the whole episode of American and the World War, as well as the finest proof of the futility of intervention, is contained in the statement of Mr. Wilson to James Kerney on December 7, 1923, relative to the policy of Poincaré in the Ruhr: "I should like to see Germany clean up France, and I should like to see Jussier and tell him so to his face."

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
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A Weekly Letter from an Englishman About Europe
John Langdon-Davies

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AN AMERICAN INFLUENCE.

My children go to a school which is open to certain American influences and one day last term they tried an excellent and thoroughly American experiment. Each child was for one whole day an adult, and each adult a child. Things went on quite as well as usual, though some surprising situations did arise. Recently I read that Los Angeles was having a "boys' week," a name which is in itself typical of America. The love of "weeks" and "days" in that great land is a perpetual surprise to the timid alien visitor. I remember one year lecturing in a Connecticut town and discovering that it was "National Education Week"; then I moved on elsewhere and found that I was lecturing on "Mothers' Day." I took the train once more to another state and woke up to find myself in "Eat More Apples Week."

Los Angeles "boys' week" handed over the city management to the



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rising generation. I am told that the minister's son preached the sermon, and that the judge's son gave judgments; in fact all the sons of Los Angeles practiced the professions and/or the vices of their fathers for one hundred and sixty-eight hours. Reading this gave me an idea: if only the population of New York could be transferred to London and the population of London to New York for one week what interesting things might happen! What would be left of the two cities at the end? What would be left of the Londoners and New Yorkers? Cigarette ends all over the subways and chewing gum all over the underground! In London a scarcity of grapefruit and oranges; a run on bacon and eggs in New York! Miserable Englishmen trying to enjoy baseball; depressed Americans try to make head and tail of cricket!

Not long afterwards chance put me in the—for an Englishman—extraordinary position of having to be in London on an August Sunday; and behold! my dream had apparently come true in at least one half; for wherever I went I looked in vain for an English face; I sighed for that notorious English accent; but there was not an Englishman to be found. On all sides there was nothing but New York, Chicago, Kansas City and Philadelphia. Let me tell you what effect the scene had upon me.

In the first place London was even more foreign than this Americanization would have made it by itself; for I had come into the fag-end of the great International-Jamboree. We have had International Rotary meetings before; but they are not anything like so conspicuous as a jamboree. Picture boy scouts, bare-kneed and covered with badges, belonging to nearly every race, oppressing and oppressed, at present distributed over the world's surface. As I entered my hotel I was met by Hindoo boy scouts, Negro boy scouts, Japanese boy scouts, Italians, Danes and heaven knows what else; and the streets were full of them. I liked to think of these children of a hundred climates imagining that they were looking at Londoners! How well dressed they must have thought the average London girl! Though I am second to none, I hope, in my admiration of the English girl, I do not admire her clothes; not since I saw Fifth Avenue, Michigan Avenue and the whole of Pasadena. Indeed the most astonishing thing about London on that particular day was the high standard of women's dress, that and the sudden increase of cigars and eyeglasses. I guarantee to tell the percentage of Americans in any given crowd by the number of Paris fashions and Havana cigars in evidence.

As I walked along the London streets entirely at a loss to know what one should do on a Sunday morning in August I found that the crowds of beautiful dresses and cigars were indubitably headed in one direction; some magnetic attraction entirely unknown and unfelt by me was evidently pulling them along. Choosing out three particularly charming dresses, armed with a Baedeker, I resolved to be pulled also. I thought as I looked at the three ladies in front of me with their old Baedeker, of the old Greek legend of the three grey sisters, whom Perseus met, with one tooth and one eye between them. I imagined that if I spoke to them, they would use their red-bound book to explain me, "give me the eye that I may see him," said the old grey sisters when Perseus addressed them; "give me the Baedeker that I may see him," I thought these would say; but I remembered that the grey sisters had added, "give me the tooth that I may bite him," so I kept my peace and my distance.

At last I discovered whither we were all going: it was to Buckingham Palace. Thanks to the general atmosphere I was about to be Americanized to the extent of seeing the Changing of the Guards or the Something-or-other of the Colors! There was a huge crowd, they swarmed round the Palace railings, they lined the pavements—calling them "sidewalks" all the time, I dare swear—and clambered all over the one monument which is definitely worse than the Albert Memorial.

The scene was very attractive, lovely Franco-American dresses and brilliant scarlet uniforms. I am ignorant of these last and I cannot pretend that I understood what it was all about. Groups of soldiers in huge uncomfortable busbies walked up to one another and handed one another a flag, while another group of scarlet men held a little concert of classical music in the corner, kodaks clicked in all directions and as always in a London crowd the most beautiful sight was a police horse, gently but firmly, pushing back the crowd with its haunches.

The Havana cigar on my right turned to me and opened conversation: "Very loyal to the king and army, all you people over here!" he commented, "that's how to keep up interest, have all this ceremony and color for people to enjoy." I looked at him, "Four out of every five," I began, "of this crowd are Americans." He looked round and nodded, "I guess you're right," he said, "there's a big sprinkling of Americans among

us today." I looked at him inquiringly: he seemed to be denying his own race. Perhaps he read my thought: "I come from Bermuda," he said; "one of your sweet and smallest colonies." Most typical Americans seem to come from Bermuda or Canada!

It is always interesting how much Americans enjoy our royalty, but it is rare to see them in such numbers that they are impressed with British enthusiasm. I can well imagine a susceptible American going away from Buckingham Palace that day convinced of the necessity of fifty more battleships to combat British militaristic feeling; for it is almost certain that no American there realized that as far as the people were concerned he was following the excellent advice of the American railroads and "seeing America first." To us, Americans are almost as obvious at first glance as if they were wearing a uniform; are we as obvious to Americans, I wonder?

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